Discourse provides an inclusive platform for reasoned discussion and prescriptive analysis of issues of both international and domestic concern, while also including poetry, fiction, art and photography to illuminate the human condition. Its emphasis is on exploring a diversity of thought and perspectives from students, scholars, and practitioners. The purpose of Discourse is to provide an open forum for discussion of contemporary dilemmas, not as a vehicle with any specific political or intellectual agenda. The perspectives represented are solely those of the authors.
THE TUFTS INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL

DEDICATED TO THE POWER OF REASON AND THE EXCHANGE OF IDEAS
EDITOR’S LETTER

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GEORGE KOLEV

JIMMY PIANKA
Dear readers,

This issue’s theme of revolution, social movements and change emerged after an incredible number of submissions were received. The subjects of papers were varied, intriguing and incredibly relevant to current events, making our task as Co-Editors in Chief inexplicably challenging and rewarding at the same time. This issue is a testament to some of the awe-inspiring work and difficult situations with which Tufts students are currently engaged.

We begin by looking at the very demographics of the generations that have created and continue to create change in an interview with Matt Bai, columnist for the New York Times. South Asian and Middle Eastern relations form the crux of the next articles in Discourse, all of which look at Western interventions in the rest of the world as they exist now, each author with his or her own perspective on how things need to evolve in these regions. Included in this is Elizabeth Herman’s article on the ever-changing perceptions of historical events learned from textbooks in South Asia, with a clear focus on the depiction of 9/11 in these books.

Chloé Rousseau then goes on to explore the nexus between revolutions and the creation of social capital from a distinctively scientific approach, followed by Amb. Jonathan Moore’s clarion call for recognizing critical gaps in US and international policies. The theme of the rich-poor gap is then echoed in Nithyaa Venkataramani’s work on food security in Guatemala, with specific attention paid to a community that BUILD has been involved with over several years. This is followed by a fictional look at Mexican immigration to America, in terms of difference, isolation and community, in Josephine Herman’s piece “Between Western and 1-94, Cermak and 6th”. Then, [EXPOSURE]’s Nicholas Dynan, through his vivid photographs, looks at one family navigating Houston, Texas’ changing Third Ward as wealth migrates from the city center.

We then delve into the impact of government-regulated migration in China in the synopsis of a research paper by three students from Peking University, who have worked in partnership with members from the Institute for Global Leadership over the last three years.

We conclude with two poems that echo the cycles of disruption and quiet.

Ultimately, we see that things are continuously changing, and while some fissures begin to mend, others cleave deeper. Revolutions have always impacted society and they manifest themselves in innumerable ways: from things we take for granted like textbooks and NGOs, to immigration, and even to violent conflict. It is the challenge to our generation to affect this change and mold it in the best way possible.

This issue would have been impossible without the impeccable dedication of the Discourse staff, the support of Heather Barry and Sherman Teichman at the Institute for Global Leadership, Tufts Community Union Senate, de.MO, and Giorgio Baravalle.

Hena Kapadia and Cody Valdes
Co-Editors in Chief
THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF A REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION

INTERVIEW WITH MATT BAI A’90

CODY VALDES
Matt Bai writes the “Political Times” column for the New York Times and is a frequent contributor for the New York Times Magazine, where he covered both the 2004 and 2008 presidential campaigns. Bai often explores issues of generational change in American politics and society. His seminal cover essay include the 2000 cover essay “Is Obama the End of Black Politics?” and a 2004 profile of John Kerry titled “Kerry’s Undeclared War.” His work was honored in both the 2005 and 2006 editions of The Best American Political Writing. Bai is a graduate of Tufts and was a member of the 1989-90 Education for Public Inquiry and International Citizenship (EPIIC) colloquium on “The Militarization of the Third World.” He is also a graduate of the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism, where the faculty awarded him the prestigious Pulitizer Traveling Fellowship. A native of Trumbull, Connecticut, he now lives with his wife and two children in Washington.

Cody Valdes conducted the interview. Cody Valdes is a student, writer, and social entrepreneur from Vancouver, Canada. As an Institute for Global Leadership EMPOWER Fellow and Synaptic Scholar at Tufts University, he has conducted research internationally in over half a dozen countries. He has co-founded social initiatives currently underway in Rwanda, Kenya, and the Israeli-Gaza border. Most recently, he was co-founder of Sisi ni Amani, a project that is developing SMS-based conflict response mechanisms in violence-prone communities in Kenya in preparation for its 2012 elections. As an Institute Synaptic Scholar, he is presently completing his undergraduate degree in Political Science and International Relations, where his primary interests include next-generation technologies, the affairs of nations, elite state-capture, the cognitive sciences, and social philosophy.

Cody Valdez
Thank you for joining us today, we’re honored and excited to speak with you. This volume of Discourse is examining revolution in all its forms — social, political, cultural — and what you are now exploring in your own research on the Baby Boomer generation (defined as those born between 1946 and 1964) and the legacy it has bequeathed to our world seems to imply that we are in the midst of a sort of generational revolution. If you look at certain definitions of revolution, we see that they demand an overthrow or replacement of incumbent regimes, and to think that we’re now cycling through a new generation of leaders, you could almost classify this as a political and social regime change along generational lines.

Matt Bai
Well you know its funny, I don’t think of it as revolution. I think of revolution as requiring a catalyst and intent, whereas I think the generational process is the kind of process that happens whether you want it or not, and most often people don’t. There are moments where it probably turns revolutionary, and I think that was probably true in the 1960s, and certainly at other points in our history. But I think now the changeover is actually much more mundane than that and, perhaps to our detriment, too slow, and could probably use some catalyst and intent.

As it is, we’re beginning to see the inevitable results of a generation aging and a new generation coming into its own in terms of its economic and demographic decision-making power. I would argue that a faster transition would be more beneficial, but I think this president is the vanguard of that change. Much like John F. Kennedy, I don’t think he sees himself in that regard; I don’t think he sets out first and foremost, or even second or third or fourth, to be a generational leader. I don’t think that’s what was on his mind and I don’t think it was on Kennedy’s mind. But, it is what he is by virtue of being the first one of a certain generation to reach that platform. Regardless of what President Obama does or doesn’t do, it presages a new era in American politics and I don’t think we’ve been very sharp about embracing that transition, and I don’t think we’ve caught up to that reality.

CV
So what is the legacy that the boomer generation has left us, in your mind?

MB
Well it’s pretty dismal. When I talk about this, I get gasps, but I find that when you explain it, even the boomers in the audience are nodding their heads in agreement. You have to first separate out what type of legacy you mean, because it’s terribly unfair and misleading, and not terribly persuasive, to argue that the boomers have done nothing of value. That’s simply not true. In fact, Barack Obama would not be President of the United States at any age were it not for the social progress that exists as a result of what we loosely call the boomer generation.

The first thing I think you need to do is look at the term “boomer,” because I think it is very flawed. There is a generally accepted academic definition of that which starts at 1946 and ends at 1964, and by that precise definition, Obama is a boomer, but culturally he really is not. So boomer isn’t really the best term — I prefer the term 60’s Generation, because what we’re really talking about are people whose world views were forged in the 1960s. So you could be born in 1944, but be deeply affected and defined by events of the 1960s. Or like Gary Hart, who I’ll talk about, who was born in 1936 and was obviously a member of the 60’s generation. But you can, like Obama, be born at the tail end of the boom, and all of your experiences can be post-60s in nature and therefore very different.

Obama really is of the generation shaped in the aftermath of Watergate and during the Reagan years, like mine. You know I was at Tufts during the late 1980s, at the tail end of the Reagan era and the beginning of the first Bush era, so this is obviously a different generational sensibility. So, “boomer” is a term I’ll only use because it’s facile, but it’s not precise.

The second thing is, I think you need to credit the 60’s generation with a tremendous amount of success in terms of social change. You know they created great movements on both the left and the right, regardless of what one thinks of the ideology; a sort of Kennedy-McGovern-ite left and the Reagan-Goldwater right were tremendously powerful movements that got their starts in the 1960s and generally were led by members of that generation. In terms of social change, both of them can claim a great deal of credit, but particularly
I think the defining characteristic of the generation that’s important here isn’t self-absorption, it’s outsider-ness. It’s anti-establishmentism. You have two generations of leaders attached to the ideal that they represent a challenge to the status quo. They were both raised to believe that they were assaulting the establishment, and it became very difficult once in power to turn that impulse off.

the left. I think the movements towards racial rights, women’s equality, and all manner of civil rights just completely redefined society, and that’s a tremendous achievement.

They made contributions to the arts, to literature, music, television, movies – we have everything from “All in the Family” to Apocalypse Now – and all of it is sort of the post-Dylan era of art that really did re-imagine what art was. It’s much more honest, it’s much more political, and it’s much more direct. Bruce Springsteen once said that Elvis freed our bodies and Dylan freed our minds, and I think that’s a part of it – eventually led to the polarization in politics that defined the generation, but I also think that, if you want to understand or policy, it was achieved against a backdrop of dizzying technological transformation that includes the birth of satellite television and 24 hour news. CNN launches some time in the 1980s and by the end of that decade, it’s a staple of political coverage and really breaks into the mainstream during the Gulf War. So this insatiable appetite for news that can hold a viewer really changes our concept of what information is, and that’s a wildly different phenomenon.

Then there’s just the trivialization of the culture in general. There’s sort of a celebrity mindset that takes hold in everything, from sports to Hollywood. This sort of erosion of private lives is probably most influenced by television and its permeation into culture which really affected politics too. So one can look at the external factors that had nothing to do with the 60’s generation, and certainly a lot of moral self-righteousness involved with the 60’s generation that’s righteousness involved with the 60’s generation that’s important here isn’t self-absorption, it’s outsider-ness. It’s anti-establishmentism. You have two generations of leaders attached to the ideal that they represent a challenge to the status quo. They were both raised to believe that they were assaulting the establishment, and it became very difficult once in power to turn that impulse off. They never really did what generations of political leaders did in America, which was to integrate themselves into the political system and then work from the inside. As soon as they got into the system, they began tearing each other limb from limb. Because they were always taking it to the man, and they never quite could stop taking it to the man.

CV
Well, one can look at the intellectual prism – or perhaps the prism – that the Cold War represented and its impact on the policies and decision making of our leaders as possibly the biggest missing piece for our understanding or our fulfillment of a legitimate and commendable foreign policy, and I wonder if that is a big part of how the boomers have gone about dictating the way that the world’s going to run for the past 40 years.

MB
Well it is a big deal, and I agree with you, I think the Cold War figures into this in a very important way, but I think in a slightly different way. I think it’s the end of the Cold War that’s critically important when you talk about this generation, because they were forged in the Cold War and when it was over, they had very little concept of where to go next. One of my core arguments here is that it’s very common and very facile to say that the boomers are the narcissists and the ‘me generation’ and they only cared about themselves, and that they’re basically a crappy generation. That is the most common form of criticism of the 60’s generation, and I’m sure that’s what some people would hear me saying too. But I’m actually making a different argument. Yes, there was a good deal of narcissism, self-absorption, and over-emoting that went on within the 60’s generation, and certainly a lot of moral self-righteousness. But there were also external factors going on that had very little to do with the character of the generation itself. And you have to divide these things out.

I think the defining characteristic of the generation that’s important here isn’t self-absorption, it’s outsider-ness. It’s anti-establishmentism. You have two generations of leaders attached to the ideal that they represent a challenge to the status quo. They were both raised to believe that they were assaulting the establishment, and it became very difficult once in power to turn that impulse off. They never really did what generations of political leaders did in America, which was to integrate themselves into the political system and then work from the inside. As soon as they got into the system, they began tearing each other limb from limb. Because they were always taking it to the man, and they never quite could stop taking it to the man.
purity that runs through both the left and the right of that generation that came from the moments in which they were born politically, and it has defined our politics for the past 30 years or so – these notions of purity and self-righteousness and the inevitable hypocrisy that flows from them. It created this notion of character that became a catch all term for everything you do in your personal life.

The other thing, if I can go back for a minute – the other external factor happening that’s a part of this is the birth of a new media generation. Journalists were just reaching an age that gave them a lot of stature at the time of Watergate, and the taking down of a public figure became the principal goal that would enable them to get wealthy and famous. So yes, Obama represents an obvious departure from the past in this way, because he is un-emotional, not self-righteous, he exudes a kind of intellectual flexibility, and he’s made this theme very overt.

In his inauguration, he said, "As the scripture tells us, it’s time to put away these kinds of childish things." And I understand that many of my colleagues think that he was talking about President Bush, but I can tell you that he wasn’t, because I followed the man for a while and I understand where he’s coming from. He was talking about both parties of a generation. We have come out of a long, childish period in our politics, and that’s where his mind is. So he does represent a departure from that. And again, I think an important thing to remember is I don’t think Obama is leading us in that direction.

I don’t think he stepped up and said ‘People, it’s time for a generational change.’ He reflects a generational change that is, and was, inevitable. He reflects the mindset of my generation frankly – I’m 41, and I think that for those of us who grew up and came of age in the Reagan years – we really tired of that politic culture, and we really tired of the self-righteousness and were exhausted with the lack of progress and the entrenched arguments that seemed to have less and less relevance to our lives. It’s one of the reasons there are so many independents in this country.

The fastest growing block of voters continues to be independents, and there’s a constant awareness of the generational change. He reflects a generational change that is, and was, inevitable. He reflects the mindset of my generation frankly – I’m 41, and I think that for those of us who grew up and came of age in the Reagan years – we really tired of that politic culture, and we really tired of the self-righteousness and were exhausted with the lack of progress and the entrenched arguments that seemed to have less and less relevance to our lives. It’s one of the reasons there are so many independents in this country.

The fastest growing block of voters continues to be independents, and there’s a constant argument about what this means, but I think it means that voters don’t want to be affiliated with a dogmatic, self-righteous mindset; they want to be humans and they want to be free agents, and they may have ideology but they don’t have this sort of Armageddonish attitude toward politics and policy. I think Obama, more than sort of defining that framework that was imposed on us than it was to figure out ourselves, and I think that does speak to the failure to adapt to the government of that time. In fact, I would argue that the history of American politics is really the history of creative and courageous leaders demanding that their government adapt to changed realities of the moment. We have been not just the strongest country in the world and freest country in the world, we have been the most creative and flexible country in the world, and that is the reason that our economy was able to change completely from an agrarian economy to an industrial economy that dominated the world. It’s the reason that we were able to change from a country that didn’t graduate a large percentage of its population from high school to a country where virtually everyone went to high school and a large number graduated from college. We did it in a very short period of time, and we did it on the state level before we did it on the federal level because we are an incredibly dynamic political society. I don’t think there’s any credence to the notion that somehow the cultural entrenched warfare of the last 30 years was somehow inevitable or a product of human and political nature – it’s been the product of a very distinct generation.

CV

There’s a real ethos of purity that runs through both the left and the right of that generation that came from the moments in which they were born politically, and it has defined our politics for the past 30 years or so – these notions of purity and self-righteousness and the inevitable hypocrisy that flows from them.
We spent very few resources comparatively thinking about what the next 50 years of American life and global life was going to look like, and how you go about retooling society to meet those challenges.
not an institution on the cutting edge. So Washington is always last, and California is always first. So maybe it’s directional.

CV
I look at the new generations as becoming shorter and shorter and shorter, and so I see my sister, who is 16, and can’t even speak to her about certain things. I’ve just been forced onto Twitter as a necessity of my work, but otherwise I wouldn’t even look at it.

MB
And she thinks Facebook is for old people!

CV
So it makes you wonder, if you concede that at a certain point generations start to define themselves in opposition to one another, if they start to look at their bigger brothers even as old and defunct, then how quickly will that translate into a haze of multiplicity, where we have ten generations in the span of 20 years.

MB
Well I really think you’re on to something; all cycles in American life are shrinking. And this is something that we need to get our heads around in politics. We’re not going to see the Rooseveltian realignment any more — we’re not going to see the great 50-year realignment because all the cycles continue to get shorter. It’s part of the technology transformation. Voters are going to change their minds every five years and, as a generation, you’re not going to get power for 40 years. I believe I said that the day after the 2008 election. I spoke on a panel at Columbia, and everybody was talking about the great realignment, and I said I just don’t think we’re living in that era any more.
Duncan Pickard, an Institute for Global Leadership Synaptic Scholar and a 2010 Tufts graduate, is a master’s candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School, where he studies international affairs. He researches human rights and U.S. foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the Arab world. In summer 2009, he interned at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, Syria, and in summer 2010, he worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in Washington. He is from Oak Bluffs, Mass., on the island of Martha’s Vineyard.
In December 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton spoke at Georgetown University about the importance of human rights in American foreign policy, responding to criticism that the Obama administration had not adequately addressed domestic and international human rights violations. Clinton argued that it was the United States’ duty to promote human rights, saying that, as a democracy, we must “commit ourselves to action” and “work for lasting peace through a principled human rights agenda and a practical strategy to implement it.” To this end, the United States has strengthened its role in multilateral human rights organizations, sent envoys to discuss human rights practices with foreign leaders, and empowered embassies to write annual human rights reports. In each role, American diplomats navigate— with varying degrees of success—the tensions between U.S. policy, international human rights doctrine, and local concepts of rights. This essay will focus these challenges by concentrating on human rights reporting and advocacy at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, Syria.

Human rights standards are outlined in a variety of international treaties and agreements, but are still interpreted and enforced by national governments. Thus, as a result of varied socio-cultural context, the impact of human rights legislation in public policy varies enormously around the world. Human rights reform is an American priority, particularly in Arab states. A 2008 Amnesty International study of 76 Arab youths in Cairo, Riyadh, Dubai, and Amman gauged support for individual rights, including imprisonment without torture, fair trials, and free speech. Eighty-six percent of respondents said they supported one or more of these rights, but 72 percent dismissed the framework of human rights as a façade used to advance U.S. foreign policy. It is a challenge for the U.S. that Arab youth, a potentially progressive force in the Middle East and representing 60 percent of the workforce, are skeptical of American policies that they otherwise support in another context. Syria in particular is emblematic of the difficulties that the United States faces in fostering human rights overseas, especially as an increasingly important player in the politics of the Middle East; Robert Peltreary, former U.S. assistant secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, has called Syria a “perpetual spoiler” of regional peace. Despite Syria’s importance, the workings of the government of President Bashar al-Assad can be difficult to discern, along with America’s real impact on Syrian society. Hoping to repair a troubled relationship, since coming to office, President Obama has relaxed economic sanctions on Syria and announced the return of the American ambassador to the country. How will these diplomatic initiatives impact or influence human rights in Syria?

Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na‘im, professor at Emory University School of Law and director of the university’s Religion and Human Rights program, distinguishes between human rights approaches of dominant and dominated people, a helpful frame for the U.S.–Syrian relationship. Within a society, he argues, dominant groups support rights that establish their values and support their interests, while dominated groups or classes are open to different perspectives that promote equality. A goal of U.S. foreign policy in Syria is to emphasize, like Na‘im, a cross-cultural approach to the “legitimacy” of rights. But many Syrians believe that “human rights” are tools of Western post-colonial control, and that the American government, perceived as dominant, is imposing a value system on a politically and economically dominated Syria. The Syrian government claims to reject international pushes for human rights primarily because of the existing perception of them as a means towards Western hegemony, and not because they would be an ineffective frame of cross-cultural dialogue. Due to differing definitions and perceptions, the human rights debate becomes politicized and is seen by the government as a threat to Syria’s domestic sovereignty.

In many nations, external government and non-governmental organizations advocate human rights to protect citizens against abusive state power. In Syria, however, the government outlaws international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) that lead advocacy and reporting efforts in many other countries, leaving Western diplomats as the sole advocates for international human rights work. Recently, scholars have debated how human rights are politicized in different contexts. Harri Englund, a researcher on human rights in Africa, writes that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights removes abuses of state power from the political structures that created them, empowering, for example, Malawi’s poor to report rights violations to NGOs. In this way, human rights are seen as “individual freedoms that represent the natural grounds for making claims.” While Englund describes how human rights can depoliticize conflicts by removing structures of power, Mahmood Mamdani, professor of Government at Columbia University, writes that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights removes abuses of state power from the political structures that created them, arguing that in Sudan, this process obscures political reality. He argues that human rights activism has reduced the Darfur conflict to a case of “Arabs” persecuting “Africans” to flatten the issue into a simplistic struggle of good versus evil, obscuring “both the fact that the violence was not one-sided” as well as that the context of acting in Sudan was precisely over who did and did not “belong in Sudan’s political community.”

Diplomats working at Western embassies in Damascus have created a transnational network of human rights professionals that often conflicts with local discourse and meaning systems, depoliticizing rights violations in a way similar to Mamdani’s Darfur. In Syria, however, diplomats also work in a space usually occupied by NGOs in other nations. Politicization, in this context refers to the condition in which human rights become a debate between international entities, instead of between state and populace. According to the U.S. State Department, the Assad regime has one of the Arab world’s worst human rights records, with documented instances of arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, and special courts holding unfair trials. The government strictly controls freedom of speech, press, and association, and systematically discriminates against Kurds as an ethnic minority. U.S. foreign policy focuses on promoting a more liberal human rights regime in Syria, including the release of key political prisoners and the closure of clandestine courts. Fundamentally, it appears that the United States and Syria differ on the relationship between human rights and national security. Syrian officials assert that human rights challenge state sovereignty, and that many Syrians believe human rights compromise state security.

One Syrian official told me, “We give up human rights, but look at our national security. We are one of the safest countries in the world. I hope the dissidents (munshaqun) who undermine the government feel afraid.”

“We give up human rights, but look at our national security. We are one of the safest countries in the world. I hope the dissidents (munshaqun) who undermine the government feel afraid.”
safe? Wdeen’s argument does not apply to activists who question the politics of acting like Kamal Labwani and Muhammad al-Hasani, two important figures in the field of Syrian human rights. Labwani founded the Liberal Democratic Union and was Syria’s leading activist until his arrest in 2007. Hasani, a lawyer who has defended Labwani and several others, was chair of the Syrian Human Rights Organization, a group that reports human rights abuses. Both groups are illegal under Syrian law. Hasani met regularly with American officials and collaborated with Human Rights Watch until he was arrested on charges related to these activities in August of 2009.

Labwani, Hasani, and many other Syrians began their activism between the summer of 2000 and fall of 2001 during the transfer of power from Hafez al-Asad to his son Bashar. This period, known as the Damascus Spring, marked a change in government policy under the new president in which limited civil dissent was tolerated. Among other changes, the government permitted a series of muhaddat, public forums on the future of government and society and released a number of political prisoners. Ninety-nine intellectuals, including Labwani and Hasani, formed an advocacy group called the Damascus Declaration to demand repeal of the Emergency Law, the release of all prisoners of conscience, the closure of secret courts, and the granting of rights to form civil society organizations. Little more than a year later, however, the activism of the Damascus Declaration, proliferation of the muhaddat, and small demonstrations began to threaten the regime and it returned to its past repressive tactics. The government arrested the leaders of the Damascus Declaration and closed all the muhaddat but one, the Jamal al-Atassi National Dialogue Forum, which was closed in 2005 after a member read a statement from the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. The yearlong reprieve from government restrictions was the impetus for the emergence of leading human rights activists today. Many of these activists are now the most important informants for the United States government on the inner workings of Syrian politics and repression. The government ban on international human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, has meant that an increasingly large role in human rights reporting is played by the Western diplomatic community, notably the United States, Canada, Norway, and the member states of the European Union, collectively called “like-minded” countries. In this way, diplomats, not human rights activists, define human rights work, politicizing human rights in a way that is unique to Syria.

If human rights work is so difficult in Syria, why is it an American priority in the first place? Erin Kelly, professor of philosophy at Tufts, argues that there are ethical underpinnings to foreign policy called International Responsibility for Human Rights, “according to which widespread human rights abuses require an international response.” She writes that justice has no borders, and that “the goal of protecting human rights should be shared globally.”

Another challenge facing US human rights efforts in Syria is recognizing how local human rights activists need to be supported in their efforts to reform their own society. Currently, these efforts appear to be at cross-purposes. This creates a fundamental rift in the priorities of foreign diplomats – motivated by their own national imperatives – and the local human rights activists – fighting for personal freedom from political oppression – they are working to support. Local activists and NGOs working in other Arab countries have goals that extend into a broader collection of rights than human rights writ broadly. Activists and diplomats often disagree over the best methods by which to pursue human rights advocacy in Syria. Several Syrian dissidents, for example, have petitioned the U.S. government to ask for the release of political prisoners as a precondition for talks with senior American officials. Despite the profession legal separation between the association and the government, this was clearly state space. In his hour-long hearing, Hasani was disbarred, and while doing that, the association crippled the availability of legal aid to political detainees.

The Syrian government’s enshrined practices empower the state to manipulate American reporting. While US diplomats in Syria make an effort to attend and observe political trials in Syria, the most serious cases are tried before clandestine courts. While trials of lesser political figures are handled publicly, cases like those of Hasani are held at the State Supreme Security Court (SSSC), the most clandestine of the Damascus courts. At the SSSC, al-Hasani was sentenced to three years in prison. Hasani’s advocacy, arrest, and detention highlight the omnipotent authoritarianism of the Syrian state, which can deploy three different courts and the bar association to punish dissidents differently and avoid scrutiny by the diplomatic community.

To work around the Syrian government, the embassies have developed a complex network of sources to collect information on human rights abuses. Diplomats follow blogs and email lists from activists and first-hand reports from interns who visit courts daily to see if a trial is in session. While criminal court schedules were often also citing connections to “terrorist organizations.”

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Many activists in Syria, including Muhammad al-Hasani, prefer the term “civil society” to “human rights.” One activist mentioned that it is more encompassing of the kinds of changes he and his peers want to see, emphasizing community rather than political clashes with the government. This rhetoric attempts to reframe activists’ work in terms of the community instead of the state. The distinction is deep, considering the growing number of scholars who have addressed the relationship between civil society – networks of community-based organizing and political.
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book is banned in Syria, but there is a well-known workaround to access the site and many Syrians including President Asad, have profiles online. Community activists have also begun using Facebook to organize. In August 2009, four men in Aleppo gang-raped a four-year-old girl and left her for dead. Supporters created a group on Facebook that encouraged members to send money or other support to the family as they struggle to recover from the attack. The family updates the page regularly with news, video, and photos, and the group has nearly 6,000 members.

In the past several years, Amnesty International has begun to gather information and advocate for human rights through Facebook in countries in which governments ban their work. Many of the videos that sparked international outrage at the 2009 Iranian presidential elections were leaked through cracks in state censorship of the media, some of which Amnesty International and other international rights organizations helped open. Social networking could be the next frontier of activism, if it can float above the borders the government seeks to enforce. Bashar al-Asad has now led Syria during three American presidencies, and his relationship with current one seems to be the best so far. Asad has authorized a land grant for a new American embassy compound, permitting the American Language Center to reopen, and he even invited the Obamas to Damascus. Will a closer bilateral relationship affect human rights reporting? It could allow for more visible American support for civil society activists, but could also influence American officials to better respect the diplomatic relationship and tone down the rhetoric of their human rights work. The question remains how closely human rights are linked to other political and economic priorities of the United States in Syria.
Children play soccer after Friday prayers at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, Syria.
1 The United States rejoined the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights in 2009, and the State Department is, for the first time, participating in the commission’s Universal Periodic Review. Michael Poster, assistant secretary of state for human rights, a former lawyer and activist, has visited dozens of countries since taking office, notably Egypt in January 2010. 


11 The government justifies its surveillance by citing the perceived ever-present military threat of Israel. Syria’s Ba’athist constitution is quite liberal; it embraces political freedoms and establishes checks and balances in the government. Since 1982, however, the government has ruled under an Emergency Law that overrides the constitution. Article 289 of the Emergency Law punishes disidents for “weakening national sentiments” during “a time of war.”

12 Some scholars have suggested that human rights are fundamentally incompatible with Islam, which is why U.S. human rights policy is so ineffective in Muslim-majority countries like Syria (Renteln 1990; Pollis 1998). While this paper focuses on a political debate between the secular governments of the United States and Syria, it is important to debunk the idea of incompatibilities between Islam and human rights. A survey of literature on Islamic humanism shows the religion is nuanced, changing, contextual, and capable of outlining compatibilities between Muslim-majority societies and human rights. Mahmood Muhammad Taba, for example, has proposed more humanitarian Qura’aic verses should replace those that currently unpin most shari’a laws. See for the lecture by Ali A. Allawi, “An Alternative Perspective: An Ethical Reading of Human Rights in Islam,” John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, November 15, 2009. A video of the lecture is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=egy5hlkhuoe. See also Anthony Chase, “Islam and Human Rights, Clash of National Order?” Ph.D. diss., Tufts University, 2005.

13 I conducted fieldwork in Damascus for three months from June to August 2009 while working as an intern at the American embassy. I cleared portions of my research with embassy officials to protect both the U.S. government and my informants.

14 Of my knowledge, no scholar have suggested that Weden's analysis of Hafez al-Asad's political control is irrelevant to the new regime, and I have no evidence to suggest otherwise.

15 Weden writes that Syrians say they believe in “incredible powers” of their president, demonstrating how they embody the power of the Asad cult. One government report, for example, heralds Asad as the country's “leading pharmacist,” though he has no background in the field.


17 Arabic literary scholar miriam cooke describes artistic criticism of the Hafez al-Asad regime, by which the government would commission poetry, sculpture, film, and other art to criticize the state, to create “an official and pseudo-utopian project to create a democratic façade” (cooke 2007, 72). This criticism, which falls under the category of what Weden calls publicized or licensed, is no longer a reality in the Bashar al-Asad regime. Authentic criticism creates the same democratic façade without government involvement.

18 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are not permitted to work in Syria by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, which must approve the function of NGOs. Human Rights Watch operates a field office in Beirut and has sources in Damascus who contribute reporting. I do not mean to imply that the human rights situation in Egypt is dramatically better than it is in Syria. There is a large body of scholarship on the role of NGOs in Egypt, including Huda Elsayad.


20 Ironically, Hasm’s founder founded the hcr association as a community for lawyers independent of the government.


31 It is possible that there are other Syrian activists working in lower social strata. If they exist, there could be several reasons why their work is invisible to the diplomatic community: prominent activists could be protecting their identities from government scrutiny; the embassy might be unable to foster strong ties with Syrian society; or organizers might believe the American embassy would react negatively to their work.

32 There is no acronym in Arabic.

33 The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MSAL) denied NGO status to a women’s shelter and exemplifies the challenges of NGO work in Syria. The authoritarian state determines who can work in what sector of society.

34 This partnership could raise other questions about Syrian’s receptiveness to foreign support for local programs. A Syrian law requires up to three years in prison for accepting money from a foreign government without approval of the regime, which is rarely given, so there is little data available for an analysis. Lebanon, speaking hypothetically, and it would “just make sense to call me a traitor” if he accepted foreign money since he has lived in Syria his entire life. For comparison, there is an important debate among NGOs and international funds in Egypt about the efficacy of foreign funding (Pratt 2006).

35 To access Facebook in Syria, users only need to include the letter “s” after “http://” in the Web address, as in https://www.facebook.com. This establishes a secure connection outside the reach of government servers.
POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF 9/11 NARRATIVES IN SECONDARY
Elizabeth Herman recently graduated from Tufts University with a B.A in Political Science and Economics. She was a student in the 2007-08 EPIIC Colloquium on Global Poverty and Inequality. She is currently a Fulbright Fellow in Bangladesh, where she is researching the political influences on the development of national history curricula. Her interest in this project stems from her senior honors thesis in Political Science at Tufts, which focused on the examination of emerging representations of September 11th, 2001 in secondary school social studies textbooks worldwide. Elizabeth has been photographing since she was in high school, when she spent countless hours in her family’s darkroom. During her time at Tufts, she has been able to intertwine her studies with her passion for photography through [EXPOSURE], the Institute for Global Leadership’s student-led documentary studies group. Her experiences with [EXPOSURE] have enabled her to investigate issues of education and human rights through the camera’s lens. During her time in Bangladesh, she hopes to similarly blend photography and her history education research.
Through selective inclusions, omissions, emphases, and de-emphases, narratives of the past can be molded to directly reflect and reinforce current political agendas and aims.
tial texts that could have been produced⁹. A comparison of the narratives in each Pakistani Studies textbook to those in the United States texts reveals some obvious omissions. The identities of the attackers are emphasized in the US textbooks, but omitted from the Pakistani narratives. For both the US and Pakistan, the narratives constitute ‘acceptable knowledge,’ or what the authority that define the texts has “recognized as legitimate and truthful”¹⁰. For Pakistan, a nation formed to provide a homeland for the Muslims of South Asia, portraying Islam in a negative light would be a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the nation. Conversely, with the identification of the perpetrators as “Islamic terrorists,” the US textbooks abdicate their responsibility to examine more deeply the motivations for the attack. As Martha Crenshaw, “a scholar at Stanford who wrote her first essay wrestling with the definition of terrorism in 1972,” states, “The use of the term terrorism delegitimizes the opponent…[t]his tactic is not just the tactics that are discredited, it is the cause, as well.” For both texts, the choices to include or exclude specific words or phrases constitute “particular constructions of reality, particular ways of selecting and organizing that vast universe of possible knowledge”¹¹.

Thus, one aspect of the 9/11 narrative is fashioned to reflect the perspective of the nation, the dominant, acceptable beliefs, in turn reinforcing these values for the next generation. As discussed in the introduction, Pakistan’s national identity is “manufactured.” Even the choice to use the word “terrorist” is not a given; as will be seen in the upcoming analysis, the Indian textbook Contemporary World Politics identifies the perpetrators as “hijackers,” never referring to “terrorism” within the description of the events of 9/11, except in reference to how other nations have referred to the event. Pakistan’s identity has been superimposed on a diverse ethnic and religious heritage since the formation of the nation in 1947. As a result, it is inherently insecure and defensive, as it requires constant vigilance; terrorism has become a global menace. Transcending national boundaries, the attack on twin towers of the World Trade Center, New York, U.S.A. on 11-9-2001 bears testimony to this fact [of the spread of global terrorism].

Textbooks do not simply describe history; they construct it.

In India, the government has primary control over the production of textbooks, which “remain the principal instructional material in the classroom, often the only reading material available,” with limited involvement from the private sector¹². In most Indian states, it is the State Council for Education and Research Training (SCERT) that is responsible for textbook development, with a Textbook Corporation or a Textbook Bureau that actually publishes them¹³. The private sector is only involved in printing and distribution; the state government bodies oversee curriculum development. The National Council for Education and Research Training (NCERT), the national-level curricular body, produces curricula and textbooks that can be — and commonly are — used by schools throughout the nation.

History textbooks in India have received significant attention in recent years, with much of the debate surrounding the “saffronization” of textbooks, a process that has sought to advocate Hindu nationalism within the narratives of the texts. The Hindutva nationalist movement, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has worked to achieve “saffronization” by both emphasizing the Hindu facets of India’s past and deemphasizing or demonizing its Muslim histories. The process of editing the nation’s textbooks began in 1998, when the BJP displaced the Indian National Congress from the majority in parliament, and continued until 2004, when the BJP was voted out of office by a large margin. At present, the Indian National Congress has resumed the power of the majority and has made a concerted effort to reverse the revisions instituted by the BJP.

This practice of editing and re-editing has garnered considerable interest over the past decade, with much of the political rallies opposing “saffron history”, notifications about numerous seminars, anthologies, and editorials on the topic, including on-line petitions protesting the “rewriting of history in India”. The debate is highly polarized, very dramatic, and hotly contested.¹⁵

Thus, the highly polarized nature of social studies textbooks in India has attracted notice and led to a great deal of research. The majority of this literature focuses, however, on the historiography of ancient history, dealing with how the narratives of the ancient Indian subcontinent are written into textbooks. As my study focuses on narratives of current events, it fills a gap in the literature on Indian textbooks and provides a number of additional avenues for future studies.

History textbooks in India do not cover topics in the twenty-first century, and therefore do not include accounts of September 11. Rather, these issues are included in Political Science, an elective course taught in India. While Contemporary World Politics was developed and approved in accordance with the nationwide curriculum, state bodies, as stated above, may also develop and produce their own curricula and textbooks. Political Science: Higher Secondary Std. XII was produced in the state of Maharashtra, India’s richest state, the second largest by population, and the location of India’s most populous city, Mumbai. The narrative in this text only briefly mentions 9/11 at the beginning of Unit (Chapter) 8, “Terrorism,” with the sentence, “The attack on twin towers of the World Trade Centre, New York, U.S.A. on 11-9-2001 bears testimony to this fact [of the spread of global terrorism]. Transcending national boundaries, terrorism has become a global menace”.¹⁷ In the lead up to this statement, the narrative describes, “The emergence of terrorism is the gravest danger which mankind faces..."officially initiated discussions regarding textbooks or curriculum...hotly discussed in the popular media.”¹⁴ Revision procedures have been met with open criticism, from Indians and foreigners alike, in journals, the media, and government bodies. As Yvette Rosseray explains:

- There have been heated debates in the Parliament with MPs walking out over historiography. Lawsuits were filed to prevent the publication of new textbooks. There were political rallies opposing “saffron history”, notifications about numerous seminars, anthologies, and editorials on the topic, including on-line petitions protesting the “rewriting of history in India”. The debate is highly polarized, very dramatic, and hotly contested.¹⁵

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in the twenty-first century,” emphasizing, “The situation has worsened during the last two decades when several groups have been found indulging in using terrorism as a means to pursue their self-interests in the international domain”8. This broad description provides no background for 9/11, nor are any motivations for the grievances of the perpetrators provided. The use of the phrase “self-interests” suggests the illegitimacy of the actors’ motivations.

The focus on terrorism within Political Science strongly contrasts with the narrative in Contemporary World Politics, which places no emphasis on the threat of terrorism. In fact, it does not refer to 9/11 as an act of terrorism, and in stead refers to it solely as an “attack,” and identifies the perpetrators as “hijackers” rather than terrorists. Rather, Contemporary World Politics devotes the majority of its attention to US hegemony. In this way, these two narratives reveal how 9/11 can be conveyed in very different ways to illustrate particular political points. Mumbai, Maharashtra has been the target of a number of violent attacks over the past two decades; as a September 6, 2008 article in the Indian magazine, Mainstream Weekly, reported: The growing menace of urban terrorism in Maharashtra started after the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts. Thereafter, a continuous spell of terrorist strikes took place following some interval of time starting from 1997, 1998, 2002, 2003 to 2006. The trend has spread across Maharashtra within the last 13 years.9

Furthermore, Maharashtra, and Mumbai in particular, is a stronghold of the Hindutva movement. Shiv Sena, a far-right political party that is aligned with the BJP, emerged out of Mumbai in 1966 (then Bombay) and has had significant influence in the city since then. Similar to the United States, Shiv Sena and the BJP have adopted very strong anti-terrorism rhetoric, and the “threat of terrorism” has topped the Maharashtra security agenda for a long time. These political dynamics may account for the emphasis on terrorism in the state-generated text, and why 9/11 is used to stress the rising threat of terrorism. Of the two Indian textbooks reviewed, the Maharashtran text is the most similar to US texts, a fact that can be explained by the aforementioned similarity in political agendas regarding terrorism; both have experienced recent terrorist attacks and both have spent considerable political capital on anti-terrorist measures. As a result, their narratives depict 9/11 as a reflection of the threat of terrorism, and the critical need to respond to it.

Why does the national level text not display the same emphasis? Since displacing the BJP and returning to power at the national level, the Indian National Congress (INC) has made a concerted effort to restore pluralist themes to textbook narratives and to delete the Hindu-right biases that were added during the period BJP-dominant rule. The varied perspectives and numerous prompts for critical thought in the NCERT’s Contemporary World Politics illustrate this effort, as does its minimization of the perpetrators’ identities and motivations. In the discussion of a correspondence with Gail Minault, Professor of Asian Studies at University of Texas at Austin, Rossely articulates the pedagogical approach adopted by national textbook writers appointed by the INC that has guided curriculum formation during period of INC rule since partition in 1947.

It would be impossible to write history from the perspectives of all the hundreds of minority groups in India. [Minault] wrote, in comment to an earlier version of this analysis, “The point is to open up the interpretation to more than one perspective and have a debate with the text — which by its very retelling is a packaging of facts.” The construction of knowledge and its reproduction in textbooks and the methods of pedagogy reveal the impact of educational imperatives and pedagogical methods inherited from the colonial model that were transcribed into the form and substance of education in post-independence India.10 This goal of “to open up the interpretation to more than one perspective” is clearly evident in Contemporary World Politics, with its numerous prompts for critical thought and provision of multiple viewpoints. While I was unable to collect additional books from India, my results, which strongly support the idea that narratives vary dependent on the political priorities of the bodies that produced them, indicate an opportunity for additional research on textbooks produced by various Indian states.

Today, when sustained success requires global cooperation and transnational alliances, textbooks that foster internationalization rather than divisions are not simply an ideal, but an imperative.
Although texts describe the past, they are “really messages to and about the future,” articulating the realm of acceptable knowledge within a society and providing a lens through which the next generation will perceive the world. Consequently, the findings of this analysis should be considered carefully for insights they provide regarding their policy implications for the United States.

Firstly, they can serve as indicators of dominant attitudes toward the US internationally. This analysis has indicated how narratives reflect political beliefs, and therefore should be a call for additional studies of this kind, incorporating a larger sample of countries. Second, textbooks can and should be used to foster understanding. The negative depiction of US bravado and unilateralism in textbook after textbook should serve as a warning to the US, illustrating the need for increased communication and exchange of ideas. Increased efforts to develop international textbooks, with narratives formulated by multiple countries, would be one way to achieve this goal. Such narratives would incorporate multiple perspectives, providing students with the opportunity to synthesize various interpretations and reach their own conclusions. The establishment of historiography courses would assist in this process, helping students learn how to question and analyze the formation of and motivations behind narratives.

Teaching students to think critically and to read between the lines, thereby empowering them to view events from multiple perspectives, is central to fostering the “global understanding of history” articulated above. Cross-national textbooks and curricula represent important tools of diplomacy that have been significantly underexplored. It is my hope that this and future similar studies will help to reveal the ways that textbook narratives are currently shaped, to encourage the reevaluation of these methods, and to promote a transformation in the way we teach and view the role of history.
MOVING TOWARD PEACE IN NEPAL:
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

INTERVIEW WITH
IAN MARTIN

CODY VALDES
JOSHUA GROSS
One of the big unanswered questions is whether the Maoists have made a real lasting strategic choice to operate within a multi-party framework or whether that is a tactical stage on the way to revolution.

I originally went to Nepal because the UN deployed a human rights mission, and I was chosen to establish and lead it. So I arrived not in a political mediation role, but initially to try to mitigate the human rights consequences of the conflict. I went through a democratic movement in 1990 that led to the resumption of parliamentary democracy – really it was the first time there was parliamentary democracy. The political parties, however, were immature; their experience in office was one of political instability. During that period, the Maoists, some of whom had been elected to the parliament after the democratic movement, first posed their demands and then launched an insurgency. Initially, nobody took them terribly seriously, but in time the Maoists dominated many rural parts of Nepal. I think that the insurgency had its roots in the marginalization of major groups of the population of Nepal. Nepal was always dominated by a caste elite that represented only a small minority of the population, and all other groups were almost wholly excluded from political power, as well as from any representation in the bureaucracy or the army. It’s not easy to understand exactly why the form that the revolt took was a Maoist ideological form, but it’s not too hard to understand what the roots of that insurgency were.

What are the issues that have driven the conflict between the Maoists and the Royalists in Nepal over the past ten years?

I think Nepal has to be seen as a country that emerged very late from isolation. Until 1990 it was virtually closed to the outside world. Nepal was a feudal kingdom run by hereditary Prime Ministers who excluded the majority of the population from education. As a result, socio-economic development and democratic evolution began extremely late in the country. It went through a democracy movement in 1990 that led to the resumption of parliamentary democracy – really it was the first time there was parliamentary democracy. The political parties, however, were immature; their experience in office was one of political instability. During that period, the Maoists, some of whom had been elected to the parliament after the democratic movement, first posed their demands and then launched an insurgency. Initially, nobody took them terribly seriously, but in time the Maoists dominated many rural parts of Nepal. I think that the insurgency had its roots in the marginalization of major groups of the population of Nepal. Nepal was always dominated by a caste elite that represented only a small minority of the population, and all other groups were almost wholly excluded from political power, as well as from any representation in the bureaucracy or the army. It’s not easy to understand exactly why the form that the revolt took was a Maoist ideological form, but it’s not too hard to understand what the roots of that insurgency were.

Interview with Ian Martin, former Special Representative to the Secretary General for the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN).

Ian Martin is Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Nepal for Support to the Peace Process. He was previously Representative in Nepal of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, May 2005-August 2006. He has worked for the United Nations in several other capacities, including as Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Timor-Leste (2006), Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the East Timor Popular Consultation (1999), Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (2000-03), Special Adviser to the High Commissioner for Human Rights (1998), Chief of the UN Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (1995-96), and Director for Human Rights of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (1993 and 1994-95). He also served in the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina as Deputy High Representative for Human Rights (1998-99). He was Secretary General of Amnesty International (1986-92) and Vice President of the International Center for Transitional Justice (2002-05). His writings include Self-Determination in East Timor: the United Nations, the Ballot, and International Intervention. Ian Martin is a recipient of the Institute for Global Leadership’s Dr. Jean Mayer Global Citizenship Award for Leadership EMPOWER Fellow and Synaptic Scholar at Tufts University, he has conducted research internationally in over half a dozen countries, recently publishing work on the intersection of foreign aid, elite oligarchies, and mass poverty in the Philippines and the impact of the Olympic Games on impoverished urban communities in Vancouver. He has co-founded social initiatives currently underway in Rwanda, Kenya, and the Israeli-Gaza border. Most recently, he was co-founder of Sisi ni Amani, a project that is developing SMS-based conflict response mechanisms in violence-prone communities in Kenya in preparation for its 2012 elections. He has been invited to speak at and participate in conferences by Engineers Without Borders International, the Human Freedom Forum, the World Bank, and the Clinton Global Initiative University in Cyprus, Norway, South Africa, and within the continental United States, and participated on planning committees for the Institute for Global Leadership’s 2009 International Symposium on Global Cities and 2010 International Symposium on South Asia. As an Institute Synaptic Scholar, he is presently completing his undergraduate degree in Political Science and International Relations, where his primary interests include next-generation technologies, the affairs of nations, elite state-capture, the cognitive sciences, and social philosophy.

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The new Nepali constitution was due in May 2010. What were some of the major obstacles to the resolution of the process envisioned by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement? How has the presence of the UNMIN influenced these obstacles? Which parties have been most harmful to the peace building process?

The first thing to say is that reaching a sufficient consensus on this new constitution is an extraordinarily difficult challenge. There are disagreements amongst the parties over the very basic forms of government that they want. The Maoists want an elected executive president; the Nepali Congress wants a presidential system. There are disagreements amongst the parties on this new constitution is an extraordinarily difficult challenge. There are disagreements amongst the parties over the very basic forms of government that they want. The Maoists want an elected executive president; the Nepali Congress wants a presidential system. There are disagreements amongst the parties on
The Maoists at that stage were at a point where they had made a deal of debate or focus on the constitution. During this peace process, agreements are generally reached between the parties in question. However, since the two armies of each side are very difficult to resolve, the most recent elections had a lot of debate. Maoist fighters might be absorbed into it, but institutional integration was an important issue. This major issue was fudged in the negotiation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It kicked the issue on the head by defining a process whereby it would be negotiated later on, and they’re still far apart on that issue. It is also linked to the constitution, because the other political parties are saying that the constitution shouldn’t be ad-

The reason that the Maoists emerged as the largest party is not because the people who voted for them are ideologically Maoist, but because they wanted change and saw the Maoists as the only party that offered that. The most successful Maoist slogan in the election was, “You’ve seen the others, now give us a chance.”

The consequences of the new federation will be drawn. There is also a backlash from the caste groups that traditionally maintain control in Katmandu and now feel threatened, so that’s a very difficult and divisive issue.

opted until the Maoist army has been integrated or disbanded and rehabilitated. Whereas the Maoists are saying that they will only complete the process of integration and rehabilitation of their army once they know that a constitution is being satisfactorily adopted. So there’s a linkage there as well. That along with the constitution is the other biggest issue that is being faced. Beyond federalism, there is the whole question of socio-economic transformation. The reason that the Maoists emerged as the largest party is not because the people who voted for them are ideologically Maoist, but because they wanted change and saw the Maoists as the only party that offered that. The most successful Maoist slogan in the election was, “You’ve seen the others, now give us a chance.”

The constituent assembly is a very unwieldy body to at-

The most successful Maoist slogan in the election was, “You’ve seen the others, now give us a chance.” The most frequent slogan used by the Maoists and the one that only the party that offered that. The most successful Maoist slogan in the election was, “You’ve seen the others, now give us a chance.”

Are there other factors to the reconciliation that are being overlooked, that are equally as important as getting the structural framework of the new government back to the people?

The boycotts of the Maoists are at a point where they have made a deal of debate or focus on the constitution. During this peace process, agreements are generally reached between the two armies. Everybody wanted a significant international encouragement was very important – the final negotiation to take place in Delhi was important. The situation has become much more difficult for the UN, because until the election – despite the tensions and diff-

What incentives and disincentives was UNMIN able to use to encourage the Maoists, the military, and the political parties towards some sort of political consensus?

First, we should be clear that the peace process was not an internationally mediated or facilitated process in general terms; the process was conducted by the political parties themselves. In a way it was King Gyanaendra — by refusing to negotiate with the political parties or the Maoists — who drove them into each other’s arms. However, international encouragement was very important — the fact that India was so fed up with King Gyanaendra that it was prepared to encourage that negotiation and allow the final negotiation to take place in Delhi was important.

UN encouragement was important as well. The UN was the only realistic candidate to play the role of observing the two armies. Everybody wanted a significant international presence during the constituent assembly election to try to improve its fairness. So the Nepalis were open to a UN role in implementation. Even before the end of the armed conflict, when I was Representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, I found that we really did have considerable leverage with both sides. One of the reasons that we had leverage with the then Royal Nepalese Army was that they are one of the oldest peacekeeping armies, and one where the highest percentage of the off-

DISCOURSE

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other. They’re accusing it of being too sympathetic to one side and not hard enough on the other — and the UN has had that criticism. It’s had it particularly not from the Maoists, but from the non-Maoist side. I think that’s because the UN’s responsibility is to re-mind everybody of the peace agreement. The UN role is there on the basis of the peace agreement, and although there are many ways the Maoists themselves have not acted fully in accord with the letter and the spirit of the peace agreement, it is in some respects the non-Maoist side that has challenged some of the fundamentals of the peace process, particularly the commitment to integrate at least some of the Maoist army into the Nepal Army, as well as the commitment to socioeconomic change.

The other issue that is difficult for the UN is that is its clearest and most visible role is the monitoring of arms and armies. This was intended to be a short-term measure that was just supposed to happen for six months or so, until elections were held and the issue of the armies was resolved. It’s now gone on for over three years and in fact, both armies have been extraordinarily disciplined. You would be hard pressed to find any other international examples where armies have remained apart under that degree of discipline for so long. But there are some respects in which the armies are restless.

The UN operation – by request of the parties – was a very light monitoring operation, it wasn’t an enforcement operation, but the political parties now tend to blame the UN for things that, in my opinion, are their own fault, especially their failure to address the real issues of the future of the armies. When there is some breach of the agreement, then UNMIN is criticized for not being a totally effective monitor. In this respect, the UN role has become much more difficult.

What do you think were UNMIN’s greatest strength and greatest weakness — do you feel that the limited mandate was advantageous or, now with hindsight, was it a disadvantage? Do you feel that the UN would have been more effective playing a more formalized role as a mediator in the conflict?

I don’t think that there was any way that the UN could have said, “Yes we’re willing to help, but we’ll only help if you give us a larger role.” Although India saw the need for the UN in arms monitoring and wanted the UN to support the election, India was not at all anxious to see third party involvement of any kind in the peace process. Nepal is in India’s neighborhood and it influences the Nepali actors very strongly in that way. So, though I do think it would have been good for the peace process if the UN had had a stronger role, I don’t think the UN itself could have achieved that. That is not to say that I think it would have been better if the UN had been a central mediator of the entire process. I do think that it was one of the strong points of the process that it was a Nepali-owned, but I think greater UN support to implementation of commitments that the parties had negotiated themselves would have benefited the process and would have avoided some of the charges and counter charges that have jeopardized the process. To take one very obvious example, the UN is sometimes criticized from within the Nepali Congress for not having criticized the Maoists more strongly for not returning property. Actually we have consistently reported the fact that they’ve failed to return property but you don’t just wave a wand at the end of an armed conflict to see property returned, especially if other people have been settled on it and the title of the property may have been disputed in the first place. It is a very complicated situation. We kept saying that the UN would always have been willing to assist with a kind of mechanism to negotiate the return of property over time. That’s the kind of issue where the process would have benefited if the Nepalis had asked us to support the implementation of the peace process.

Would you say that your experience in Nepal holds lessons for other insurgencies in South Asia: the Indian Naxalites, the Balochis in Pakistan, the LTTE in Sri Lanka, or the Taliban in Afghanistan? In your experience is political reconciliation the endgame for all insurgencies? Would you be able to draw linkages between the insurgencies that are in the region?

Well, I don’t believe that reconciliation is always possible. I think a different leadership of Tamils in Sri Lanka could have secured a peace agreement that would have been much more in the interests of the Tamil population than the outcome of the conflict. The failure of Sri Lanka’s peace process can be attributed to both sides — not just the intransigence of the LTTE but also the way in which over the years, it had eliminated moderate Tamil voices and turned itself into a highly undemocratic force. So you can’t say that it’s always possible to reach agreement and reconciliation with any insurgency, it depends on the wisdom of the insurgency as well as on the state party. I think Nepal is a positive example in both the willingness of the Maoists to change strategy and reflect upon failures, and of the fact that their armed struggle would not eventually succeed. It is also a positive example of the wisdom of some political parties who saw that political reconciliation was in the interest of the country as a whole.

Can an insurgency be considered to be “finished” without a peace process?

An insurgency may be defeated, but that doesn’t mean that the conflict has ended. I think it still remains to be seen in Sri Lanka how far there’s a political leadership that is willing to address some of the original causes of conflict in Sri Lanka. And equally I hope Nepal is not going to slip back into armed conflict, and I certainly don’t think it’s going to slip back into the same kind of armed conflict as has happened over ten years with the
I think the continued labeling of the Maoists as a terrorist organization, even after they entered the peace process, entered an interim government, participated in an election and emerged as the largest party, is really counter-productive.

Maoist insurgency. But the conflicts from which that insurgency emerged, the social conflicts in Nepal, are very sharp and unresolved. It goes back to the question of whether they can be contained in a federal constitution that commands a certain degree of consensus and whether one can ensure that conflicts don’t take other violent forms in future. So it’s not just a question of “Do the Maoists go back to war?” It’s a question of “Do the fundamental social conflicts take violent form in the future?” It’s going to take a great deal of skill and political leadership on the part of the Nepalis to avoid that completely, because there are real risks of ethnic conflicts turning violent in Nepal.

You mention that UN representatives have formed relationships with the Maoist leadership over the last few years, and that these relationships have been helpful. How have these relationships enabled the UN to play a constructive role in the wider process? On the other side of that coin, how did the U.S.’s decision to label the Maoists a terrorist group influence the process?

If you have a violent insurgency that is committing human rights abuses, you want to firstly persuade it to end those abuses and respect the principles of humanitarian law. And the Maoists committed appalling abuses, you want to firstly persuade it to end those abuses and respect the principles of humanitarian law. And the Maoists committed appalling abuses. This even occurs in high-profile international cases, like that of Maina Sunuwar, a 15-year-old girl who was disappeared by the Nepal Army.

You think it’s just a matter of time?

It’s not a discussion that I’m close to, but I closely followed the recent visit of the Assistant Secretary of State to Katmandu, which has been the most recent high level discussion of the issue. I think it’s fairly clear that the U.S. wants to move towards lifting the terrorist label, but indeed still wants more from the Maoists in achieving that.

What is the trade off between justice and peace in Nepal? How do Nepali citizens pursue reconciliation in the shadow of human rights violations?

While most of the right things were said during the peace process and written into the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and other agreements, I don’t think one can attribute sincerity to them, because almost nothing has happened to implement them. From the very first ceasefire agreement there was a commitment to investigate disappearances and the commitment has been made over and over and again, and still as of today, there has been no serious investigation into disappearances. It would certainly be uncomfortable for firstly the Nepal Army, because they are responsible for the largest number of disappearances; to some extent for the leadership of the parliamentary parties who were in office at the time when those disappearances occurred; and for the Maoists who were responsible for a lesser number of disappearances but nonetheless also have responsibility. It would be uncomfortable, but I don’t believe it would jeopardize the peace process. The lack of action is inexcusable, not only investigations of disappearances but the lack of any prosecution, even in the most visible cases. In many cases where the responsibility is extremely clear, few of the perpetrators have been brought into court; the political parties and the Army protect people from court proceedings rather than supporting prosecution. This even occurs in high-profile international cases, such as that of Maina Sunuwar, a 15-year-old girl who was disappeared by the Nepal Army.
I have a slightly different view in relation to a truth commission. As far as investigating disappearances is concerned, there is an obligation to the families who’ve lost loved ones. The truth commission serves a much broader purpose, and I don’t believe that the political conditions for a truth commission for the purpose of reconciliation currently exist in Nepal. Nepal would be better advised to set up a truth commission once the new constitution is adopted, another round of elections has been held, and the situation has stabilized further, rather than in the high-conflict situation that exists now. If it occurred today, I think the victims would still have very reasonable fears about testifying to a truth commission, for fear of reprisals from the Army or the Maoists.

Is there any way for the international community to marshal resources to erode this culture of impunity in Nepal?

The international community has tried to exert pressure, perhaps the most significant now are the conditions attached to assistance to the Nepal Army by the U.S. Congress. But so far, despite all the pressure, it hasn’t resulted in the cooperation that ought to take place.

In this issue of Discourse we are looking at how social structures and human networks are affected by revolution; social capital for instance. Could you comment on how society and human interaction has been affected by not only the ten-year insurgency, but also by the peace process?

Nepal is a country going through an extraordinary social revolution and going through it at a speed that very few societies have had to do, precisely because it was frozen for so long in feudalism. One of the consequences of that is you have kids in Kathmandu who are on the internet and cell phones, as globalized as anybody, and you have people in the villages who are still operating in a way that you can really only call feudal. Now, the Maoist insurgency I think had a big effect on social relations. It very obviously did in relation to gender. Maoists went out to recruit young women to their army as cadres. That’s not the ideal form of women’s liberation, but it certainly had an impact on gender relations in Nepal. They recruited Dalits from the very bottom of the caste system. It’s not only the Maoist insurgency, a lot of other things have been happening at the same time, including work by many excellent peaceful NGOs and civil society organizations, so one must be careful not to credit the Maoist insurgency with all social change. But nonetheless it’s been a significant factor for social change. And in that respect, the genie is out of the bottle, that can’t be turned back. The composition of the constituent assembly really is revolutionary. We watched the first session of the constituent assembly and saw these younger people with faces that reflected the different ethnicities of Nepal. However, such an extraordinary social revolution is extremely hard to manage, especially in trying to reach consensus on federalism and a future governance arrangement. So whether it’s a Maoist revolution or not in Nepal, it’s certainly a social revolution.
DO REVOLUTIONS DESTROY OR GENERATE SOCIAL CAPITAL?
Introduction

Conflict and turmoil produce mental distress and disruption, often upsetting relationships and changing social structures. Internal conflicts make up more than 90 percent of the world’s modern conflicts, and revolution has been a common and brutal source of turmoil, especially in developing nations, setting them into a dangerous cycle of building and destroying. Emile Durkheim defined anomie as a lack of clear societal or moral norms and his influence is seen in many works that seek to examine the role of revolution on social capital (SK) and mental health, emphasizing the disturbing and negative effects of a tumultuous upset on the individual. As a result, however, until recently very little attention has been paid to the possible positive outcomes of such conflicts. This essay does not assert that conflict or violent change is beneficial or positive. War and conflict, though catalysts for change, are based on largely indiscriminate destruction and result in death, suffering, fear and loss. However, if conflict is an inevitable part of human nature and interaction, it is imperative that we begin to look at what positive effects can be generated by conflict, especially to execute post-war efforts in a more effective manner. This can be especially helpful in the cases of revolution and insurgency, where internal dissatisfaction has led to violent change, and focusing on returning to “pre-conflict” society may not only be difficult but also undesirable.

With the emergence of the study of resilience, post-conflict analysis has shifted to include a salutogenic interpretation – one based on healing, recovery and response – of human response. Looking at resilience as an individual and community attribute, and at social capital as an important factor in resilience, we must begin to ask whether and how social capital is generated and strengthened by revolution. War and conflict are inevitable, so we must learn to build out of conflict, looking forward rather than returning to a stagnant, generic, or even fabricated “ideal.”

Dr. Astier Almedom’s diagram of the “Adaptive Cycle” [Figure 1] provides a framework for understanding the constant dissolution and regeneration of societies and their structures. The model highlights the cyclic and dynamic nature of all “living” and evolving systems. Just as governments and established social orders grow out of political, economic and social climates, they just as easily dissolve with changing circumstances, only to re-emerge in new and better-adapted forms. For this reason, the generation and destruction of government can be seen as a “dynamic steady-state,” based along a continuum of death and rebirth. In this light, we can begin to contextualize the tragedy of conflict and violence within the very natural and inevitable cycle of societal systems, as dynamic entities.

This paper seeks to examine the possibility that revolution may in fact be a generative as well as destructive force, through the following guiding questions: Rather than viewing conflict as a purely destructive force, is there any type of social capital that is actually generated by or during conflict, specifically revolution? What aspects of revolution build social capital? Finally, what implication does this hold for development efforts in post-revolutionary societies?

Chloé Rousseau was born in Paris, moved to the United States at age six, and now lives in North Carolina. At Tufts, Chloé is majoring in Community Health and Spanish. During her time at Tufts, Chloé has been very involved with the student-led BUILD Guatemala program. Chloé is interested in global health and policy, including studying practical solutions to health problems in the developing world, and is considering a possible career in law and health policy. Last spring, while studying abroad in Madrid, Spain, Chloé began studying the works of Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss as part of her research internship with the International Resilience Program under Professor Astier Almedom’s guidance. She is currently interning with the Harvard "Family Van", a mobile health clinic that provides free screenings, counseling and health education to under-served communities in the Boston area. The IRP is a program of the Institute for Global Leadership and Dr. Almedom is an Institute Fellow.
I. Social Capital is a crucial part of building and sustaining revolutionary movements. Social Capital (SK) provides channels of communication and exchange, through which movements are organized and carried out and also serves as a source of motivation and inspiration, pushing revolutionary efforts forward. According to Fuhrmann (2006), during the Tulip Revolution of Kyrgyzstan in 2005—which the populace ousted the authoritarian government of Askar Alyev—SK was not merely a primary, but an essential factor in the organization and success of the revolution. Furhmann makes an interesting distinction between “Imported” and “Indigenous” social capital, claiming that both were vital to the movement. “Imported” SK, he argues, consists of NGOs and other formal organizations of a “western” nature. These organizations succeeded in spreading western democratic ideals, providing information on current events and encouraging public discourse of these happenings, coordinating factions, and explaining the examples of other countries that had undergone revolutions, such as Georgia and the Ukraine. “Indigenous” SK played a role in fostering social trust, which lead to collective action. It also provided a forum for discourse, led citizens to expect more from their government, allowed information to spread more easily, unified competing factions and motivated citizens to participate out of a sense of social obligation.

This idea of “duty” as a product of SK and a motivating factor for revolution can be seen in other examples, such as the American Civil War. Costa and Kahn (2009) describe the appalling conditions of soldiers, attributing low desertion rates in these conditions to the high presence of SK and the sense of group loyalty. In fact, the more homogeneous the battle groups, the more loyal the soldiers and the less likely they were to desert. Greene (1999) also discusses the phenomenon of SK itself as a motive for the American Revolution, as men fought to preserve the blossoming social capital of their infant society.

In general, Furhmann argues that SK in Kyrgyzstan was essential to the revolution in that it lowered the transaction costs by coordinating between the north and the south, cultivating civic skills, unified the voices of divergent groups and established a sense of communal identity, fostering trust in “people power” and the “we” instead of the “I.”

II. The presence of social capital in a society is a determining factor of violence levels in revolutionary action. A study from Nepal, conducted by Alok, Mitchell and Nepal (2006), describes the impact of higher SK and levels of democracy on violence. In short, “the higher the amount of social capital, the lower the level of government and insurgent violence.” Thus, violence on both sides seems to be tempered by a higher level of SK. Lower levels of insurgent violence were attributed to the fact that insurgents are less likely to be active in areas with high levels of political participation. Likewise, lower levels of counterinsurgent violence were attributed to the fact that higher SK leads to social cooperation in restraining officials from abuse of power and maintaining respect for the rule of law.

In Kyrgyzstan, high levels of both “indigenous” and “imported” social capital resulted in an extremely peaceful revolution. This sense of community, argues Fuhrmann, steered revolutionaries away from violent outbursts to more peaceful demonstrations, as individuals acting with a sense of social duty were less likely to act in ways detrimental to society.

III. The presence of Social Capital is also an important factor in community resilience to the stresses of conflict and instability. Kawachi and Berkman’s (2001) explanation of the two models for SK in relation to mental health include the main-effect model, where the presence of SK directly benefits mental health, and the buffering-effect model, where an individual’s relationships and support systems lessen the detrimental effects of stressors.

Several studies show the buffering effects of SK on people experiencing the effects of revolution. Roe’s (1992) study of displaced Palestinian women showed that these women saw events as less stressful when they were perceived as collective experiences. Similarly, Gervais and Denov’s (2007) study examining girls’ resilience in the Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front concluded that young girls found comfort in their bonds with other girls. These relationships were, “instrumental to their psychological and emotional well-being during armed conflict” according to Gervais and Denov, Pederson et al. (2008) also found similar results in their study in the Peruvian highlands, as the correlation between exposure to violence and the experience of trauma-related symptoms depended, in large part, on the nature of social support networks.

IV. Revolution is characterized by destruction. As revolution leads to instability and insecurity, social capital is eroded. According to Goodhand et al. (2000), insecure environments foment this erosion because people feeling insecure will be less willing to invest in their future, be it politically, economically, mentally or emotionally. Weede and Muller (2009), in their paper about revolution, begin their definition of this concept with, “Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state.” The idea of transformation is essential when examining the role of destruction in revolutionary movements. Though revolution generally leads to a waste of life, reduction in productivity and destruction of social capital, it must be noted that, referring back to Almedom’s adaptive cycle, destruction is an inevitable precursor to regeneration and an inevitable part of transformation and revolutionary change.
were assigned much more active community roles. This obviously has its own implications for the empowerment of women, but also provides a valuable basis for the generation of new SK as new communities are established based on new norms, often leading to collective action. This collective action is not only often a response to perceived injustice, but can also be, in itself, another source of social capital. Overall, displaced women forced to rebuild and establish new communities found new solidarity in collective action.

Social Capital is also both employed and generated during periods of stress and insecurity as a coping mechanism. As seen above with the idea of “stress-buffering,” relationships and social networks are important when investigating SK as a source of resilience in revolution. In this way, SK affects the way in which individuals and communities are affected by revolution. SK is also, however, generated by groups as a natural response. Girls in the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone could not rely solely on pre-existing SK as a source of comfort (though they did often seek out girls from the same or neighboring villages). For the most part, girls formed new bonds and networks as a strategy for coping with the violence, abuse and insecurity of revolution. Goodhand et al. describe this ‘defense mechanism’ in the context of bonding and bridging social capital, as times of insecurity cause people to turn towards homogeneous institutions such as religious groups, family and caste, resulting in deepened bonding social capital, sometimes at the expense of bridging social capital.

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Apart from fostering the growth of SK through the mobilization of collective resources, SK is also generated from the vulnerable state of disrupted social norms. Roe’s study in Palestine found that although conflict overturns and destroys social norms, doing so provides the necessity for people, especially those who are displaced, to assume new roles and establish new norms. This proved especially significant for displaced women, who

tern in which SK arises from a new social order, leading to a climate conducive to collective action and social change. With this change comes the concomitant disruption of social order and norms, breaking down SK and resulting in the establishment of new social structures, which, in turn, feed into a new social order.

A study was conducted by Booth and Richard (2006) on the lasting impacts of the Nicaraguan revolution on participation and civil society engagement. Their findings state that revolution leads to higher civil society engagement, more communal organizations and unions, and, consequently, elevated electoral engagement. Combining these findings with Furmann’s observations in Kyrgyzstan, we can construct a model in which SK feeds into and is generated along each step of Booth and Richard’s proposed progression. Another important factor in the relationship between revolution and social capital is the presence of a motivating goal or ideology. These ideologies must grow out of an enabling climate of SK (a certain set of social norms conducive to the adoption of this view) but can also be a regenerating source of SK.

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Both “bonding” and “bridging” social capital are essential to the growth and progression of movements, as well as community resilience to the effects of war. As defined by Robert Putnam in Simon Szreter and Michael Woolcock’s paper “Health by association? Social capital, social theory, and the political economy of public health,” “bonding” social capital refers to trusting and cooperative relations between members of a network who perceive themselves as similar in terms of shared social identity. In contrast, “bridging” social capital refers to relations of respect and mutuality between people who know they are not alike in some way relating
A predominant focus on returning to “pre-conflict” ideals is often neither practical nor desirable, as this is essentially a loop back to the same circumstances that spurred these movements.

to social identity. It is important to recognize, in dividing, labeling and analyzing these types of SK in a revolutionary context, that both types are essential and dynamic, depending on the stage, nature and location of the movement. Furtmünn’s description of Kyrgyzstan’s “Tulip Revolution” provides clear examples of the successes of “bridging” SK between the north and the south, mobilizing resources, information and man-power. This revolution was also an extremely peaceful one. Looking at Goodhand et al.’s example from Sri Lanka, however, provides valuable insight into the dynamics and interactions between bonding and bridging. Bonding social capital, claims Goodhand et al., is generated by revolution, at the expense of bridging social capital. This is especially true in the case of small, tight-knit and united insurgent groups, especially when these consist mostly of individuals from one caste or religious affiliation. Goodhand et al. employ the term “anti-social capital” to describe these, whereby strong bonding unions and schools, showing that the revolution did, in fact, begin to examine the constant dynamic transformation of SK using the existing strongest networks as a foundation to make meaning of past experiences and translate it into a ‘fresh start’, creating order out of the disorder of conflict. Pederson concludes that social reconstruction must be the primary goal of any post-revolutionary effort, emphasizing the need for an examination of indigenous coping methods and social structures. Goodhand et al. call for a less direct approach, claiming that instead of trying to establish and impose forms of social capital, efforts should be focused on the creation of an “enabling” environment, in which SK can naturally build and develop. At the same time, social capital is not always put to positive uses and outcomes, even after conflict is over. For this reason, Goodhand et al. propose this type of enabling environment, in which sustainable and appropriate SK will grow organically. Their proposed plan in Sri Lanka involves increasing good governance, rather than simply attempting to reduce the power of the state; providing support for an educational system based upon bridging, rather than highlighting ethnic and language divides; and promoting the spread of civil society organizations also spanning these divides.

Up until now, western post-conflict mental health efforts have focused predominantly on the identification and treatment of post traumatic stress disorder or other illnesses, resulting in a very vertical and disintegrated approach. Just as revolution grows out of societal factors and existing forms of SK, so must post-war efforts. A predominant focus on returning to “pre-conflict” ideals is often neither practical nor desirable, as this is essentially a loop back to the same circumstances that spur these movements. Examining the quantity and quality of social ties and networks post-conflict is an essential part of analyzing the current climate for effective and sustainable change.

Conclusions

More analysis of the ways in which SK is formed and transformed during revolutionary conflict is needed, especially as we see a shift towards internal conflict. Until now, social capital literature has targeted violent conflict as a destroyer of social capital, labeling zones of conflict as “defective” in SK. According to Goodhand et al. this may be inaccurate, as this notion lacks both evidence and support. One reason for this shortcoming may be that, generally, SK literature focuses on “conflict” as a “lack-of-trust” or “lack of accountability”, treating the idea of actual armed conflict as a completely separate entity. This view of conflict as its own external agent is not only false, but also detrimental to our understanding of revolution and resilience. Conflict, especially internal conflict, is a product of society, and is therefore embedded within it. Looking at internal conflicts, specifically, enables us to view these transformations within a closed system, examining the rise and fall of revolution within a complex and ever-shifting climate of social capital. The fact that SK has proven to be such a significant influence not only upon the growth of movements and the way they play out, but also on the ability and extent to which individuals and communities experience and heal from conflict, makes it a valuable phenomenon to investigate.

The implications of understanding the influence of SK are vast, especially in finding ways to manipulate SK and different forms of it. Though existing literature establishes a clear relationship between revolutionary movements, SK and mental health, more research is needed to examine revolution, specifically, as its own distinct type of conflict. Looking at revolution as a potentially constructive, rather than a purely destructive, force is an essential part of exploring this relationship. Only by examining the SK structures of revolutionary movements can we begin to understand the complex socio-political climates that lead to this type of turmoil. In order to move forward, we must begin to examine the constant dynamic transformation of SK using the existing strongest networks as a foundation for growth in the aftermath of tragedy.
INFUSING A MORAL IMAGINATION IN US POLICIES
Ambassador Jonathan Moore has worked in government, politics, academia and the United Nations for more than 40 years. He served as U.S. Coordinator for Refugees and Ambassador-at-Large and as Director of the Refugee Programs Bureau in the U.S. Department of State, and as a U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Previously, he was Director of the Institute of Politics and Lecturer in Public Policy at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, for twelve years. Amb Moore has been on the Institute for Global Leadership’s External Advisory Board since its inception and is a recipient of the Institute’s Dr. Jean Mayer Global Citizenship Award. In accepting the award, he reflected on the formative experiences in his career in public service, as well as lessons learned.

Before being fully aware of it, I think, I was fascinated by international affairs and cross-cultural experiences and vaguely thought I wanted to find some way of tapping into them. I was romantic and idealistic, characteristics not uncommon in young people, but which I can’t say I’ve quite gotten over. I was drawn to the idea of public service. Later, it seemed I was set to be a generalist — not having detected any indication of specialized competence in myself, the broadly superficial seeming to be safer to hide in, and unappreciative of the dangers of dilettantism, which I’ve been trying to realize ever since. In any event, I wanted adventure, excitement, and if not to make the world a better place, to understand it better and see what I might learn about human nature and behavior.

There are a few discoveries I made along the way among such people and activity which have stuck with me and which I’ll try to share.

I remember pledging that I should try continuously to seek the connections of things and people, of communities and sectors. I left an early start in the Foreign Service to try to connect security and development in poor and conflicted countries — a symbiotic relationship out of synch.

I have become increasingly plagued by a number of persistent, deeply embedded shortcomings, or “gaps”, in the evolving efforts of the “international community”, individually and collectively, to deal with the clashes of our interdependent, globalizing world. Together they reveal serious anthropological weaknesses in our human ability to cope, let alone lead.

There is the gap between the denial and the perception of reality; we are very good at denial, because the truth doesn’t fit into what we are willing to tolerate or what is consistent with our own immediate interests. This is related to the “keep things simple/engage complexity gap” in which we stubbornly insist upon the simple because the complex is scary and impenetrable and because our political process does not reward confronting it.

Next, there is the “capacity gap,” which involves our not having the capacity to actually deliver on our policies and plans. In the case of various “humanitarian interventions” around the world — by the U.N., “coalitions of the willing”, the U.S. — the challenge involved is invariably defined at the level at which we are willing to invest in it. This is distinct from how huge it actually is and its much greater true proportions — Appalachia vs. the Himalayas. This is illusory and causes response strategies to be distorted and ineffective from the start. An example is the current U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, which assumes a capacity on the part of the Afghans, which they do not have, and a capacity to do our part, which we cannot sustain.

The misunderstanding of the factor of time produces another gap between a “can do” and “quick fix” mentality and the ruthlessness of long-term requirements for progress. The problems of poverty, conflict, and low development require an open-ended commitment to generations of shared effort rather than near-term exit strategies.

The cumulative impact of these is foreboding, but the biggest of all is the “rich/poor” gap — the earth’s fundamental moral inequity and dysfunction, which is widening and affects everything else. There are a number of huge, converging forces in our globalizing world, which radically threaten our interests and challenge our ability to survive. They include climate change, nuclear proliferation, the linkages of economies globally, ocean-crossing diseases, expanding ethnic and religious conflict, and international terrorism. They ignore geographical and political boundaries, are gaining momentum simultaneously, and although still subject to our influence, they are beyond our control. In addition to its own horrific properties, the rich-poor gap infects and exacerbates every one of these forces.

I think new values as well as new strategies are needed to meet these forces and to close the gap. Both decisions proved their value. The same with academia: Okay, how do scholarship and theory apply to policy and action and how can the two realms reinforce each other? A work still in progress; A subsequent and still ongoing struggle for me in trying to connect security and development in poor and conflicted countries — a symbiotic relationship out of synch.

An example is the current U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, which assumes a capacity on the part of the Afghans, which they do not have, and a capacity to do our part, which we cannot sustain.
We now resemble a non-egalitarian society with dysfunctional politics moving towards isolationism. I fear that we may be too buried by our own problems to give the world enlightened attention, increasingly unprepared domestically to deal internationally.

American foreign policy should be radically reconstructed by integrating a true grasp of reality and complexity with a perpetual infusion of moral imagination. One model for attempting this would be a priority commitment in every dispute, for every challenge to achieve the maximum benefit for the highest number of parties. This would encompass strategies to close the rich-poor gap and form the core framework of our efforts internationally to achieve peace and security. We would define our own interests within the multiplicity of human need, rather than pitting them against others and forgetting about the rest. We would have to compromise in ways we haven’t thought of in order to achieve something closer to the common good, while protecting enough of our national needs to assure our own continuing progress. This path would be extremely difficult, the perseverance and balancing of factors would be prodigious, the time needed unending. But it would recognize that our own long-term security depends upon the security of others, and that we cannot survive in a world of apartheid. And it would embody moral authority and generate moral energy, valuable assets for transcending the challenges ahead.

We all know that no foreign policy can be pursued successfully without strong and sustained public backing at home. The kind of international strategy I’m suggesting for the U.S. would, in particular, place extreme stress on the polity’s understanding, generosity, and nerve. The prospects are forlorn. Conceivably, one might have thought that a combination of unprecedented and intensifying global forces threatening the long-term quality of our lives, plus the arrival of a new President with a vision of the world and its future and an inclusive leadership style, might have encouraged a more expansive appreciation of our stakes in the world and the coherent behavior required to advance them. Not so. Amidst anxiety, deprivation, and impatience, we are too selfish, negative, divided and exploitative. We are separating, not connecting. We behave as if the President has the exclusive responsibility for solving our problems. The rest of us—tribes, sectors, institutions, the general citizenry, the political parties and Congress, ostensibly the self-governing agents of our political system—fail our role of affirmative political engagement to generate support and consensus. We now resemble a non-egalitarian society with dysfunctional politics moving towards isolationism. I fear that we may be too buried by our own problems to give the world enlightened attention, increasingly unprepared domestically to deal internationally.
Export Agriculture and its Role in the Escalating Nutrition Crisis of Guatemala
NUTRITION CRISIS OF GUATEMALA

Nithyaa Venkataramani is a sophomore at Tufts University majoring in International Relations and Biology. Nithyaa has been a part of the BUILD Program for Sustainable Development since 2009 and now serves as the co-director of the BUILD program’s work in Tamil Nadu, India. BUILD is a student-led initiative of the Institute for Global Leadership.
For the Guatemalan farmer, the workday begins with the first sun's rays hitting the sides of the houses neatly lined up in rows. Santa Anita La Unión, a coffee cooperative of 32 families in the Quetzaltenango province of the western highlands region, gives us a glimpse of a place seeming like paradise, where the daily toil can often be overlooked in favor of idealizing the agricultural lifestyle. Life here may move more slowly than in the bustling cities of New York or Boston, yet there is much to be done between sunrise and sunset – much of which is hard physical labor that community members have been doing for years, day in and day out.

The growing and harvesting of coffee, a staple of Guatemalan agriculture, is a long and tenuous process, from which a small seedling plant transforms and produces the colorful green and red beans, the quantity of which actively determines the quality of life of the cultivator. The same is true for all export crops grown in Guatemala – they are labor-intensive and dependent on foreign markets. “It is well known that as Guatemalans, we drink the worst coffee,” says a representative of FUNDAP, a Guatemalan NGO that works to promote activities that support people and communities with scarce economic resources. “All of the best products of this economy are exported out.” And it is true – look at where your organic and high quality food products come from, and you will realize that most come from places where labor is cheap and land is seemingly plentiful.

In Guatemala, the agricultural economy has been tied to foreign markets since its conquest by the Spanish conquistadores in the 16th century. Export agriculture evolved throughout the centuries from traditional corn and bean crops to many non-traditional crops exclusively produced for the global market, the most prominent being coffee, cacao, bananas, sugar, and more recently broccoli and snow peas. These crops, not traditionally a part of the Guatemalan diet or culture, have defined the farmer’s experience and quality of life, especially for the indigenous population in Guatemala. Less access amongst the indigenous people compared to the ladino class has a distinct and direct correlation to the overarching history of land distribution and ownership throughout the country.

In conjunction with the development of agriculture in this country, a widespread domestic food crisis has slowly escalated over the last century. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Guatemala today has the highest rate of chronic malnutrition in Latin America, and the fourth highest rate in the world. When the problem of malnutrition was first recognized, foreign aid programs were quick to propose a solution. The World Bank, in the 1970s, sought to address the link between poverty and income distribution with malnutrition.

- Malnutrition is largely a reflection of poverty: people do not have enough income for food...The most efficient long-term policies are those that raise the incomes of the poor, and those that raise food production per person. Other relevant policies include food subsidies, nutrition education, and increasing emphasis on producing foods typically consumed by the poor.²

Forty years later, the situation has only gotten worse. Part of the problem of efficiency and clear progress may be that food security cannot be looked at through a purely economic lens, as there are many other factors that come into play. These include existing cultural values, the production and availability of food for consumers, and longstanding racial and social inequalities. The history of the country has shaped its dependency on exporting, which itself is a major factor in the escalating nutrition situation. Unfortunately, food security and assistance often focuses solely on how much a family can buy – their purchasing power – rather than existing problems with food production itself.³

There are many more risks associated with being involved in the global market trade, because tying farmers to foreign markets leaves them incredibly vulnerable to exploitation and upheaval. Some of these vulnerabilities include participating in an outside market for which they do not have any information like price fluctuations, and being dependent on pesos, or middlemen, to settle exporting deals. According to dependency theory formulated by social scientists Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Faletto Enzo, the way in which impoverished developing countries are integrated into the world system often profit the developed countries the most at the expense of the resource-filled farmers.⁴ This theory applies in particular to the regions of Latin America, which have been highly involved in the global market for centuries, but have yet to see the type of growth and progress of developed nations.

However, it is wrong to think that globalization is a root evil cause and to take a paternalistic view of the Mayan farmers who want to demand more. Dr. Edward Fischer points out that the Mayan farmers that he worked alongside explained that they did know the risks, but that simple core values like keeping the family together during harvest season and working together were not compromised by shifting from milpa farming to export farming. To keep up with the rest of the world, the Guatemalan farmer believes that this is the way to a better and more stable economic future, no matter how much information imbalance there exists. The positive implications of having an export-oriented economy are that communities experience economic growth that they would not have achieved through subsistence production. Globalization has also led to a sense of pride for Guatemalan farmers who know that they are competing alongside other countries for foreign consumers. In a way, cultivators believe that economic prosperity may provide a way for the new generation to move into the professions and lifestyles they desire.

Income, however, is not the ultimate goal. The cultural ties to community, as to land, are the mechanisms that farmers try to keep in perspective. Income is simply the means to provide an education and other employment opportunities to the children of the farmers who have known nothing else.

Income, however, is not the ultimate goal... Income is simply the means to provide an education and other employment opportunities to the children of the farmers who have known nothing else.
Yet the colonists’ system of export-based profit quickly made Guatemala dependent on this trade and created structural imbalances that would impede sustainable and long-term development of both industry and the agricultural economy.

The Story of Land and Poverty in Guatemala’s Development

A clear racial division defines the social hierarchy existing in Guatemala. *Ladinos*, the people of Spanish descent, comprise most of the middle-class that oversee the production and economy of the country. Within this *ladino* class, another division exists, which separates the middle class from the most elite — a group that comprises an oligarchy that has overwhelming influence on market control and distribution of goods. The oligarchy’s network impedes the equality of benefits provided by public and governmental policy, a structure that is detailed by author Marta Casas Arzu in *Limpie y Raismon*.

The indigenous Mayan people form the base of the hierarchic pyramid, representing the lower class that has always been linked to agriculture, particularly corn. Even in the era before the conquest, the underclass of people was made up of peasants who worked the land. Mayan beliefs and cultural traditions gave special spiritual importance to the cultivation of the land, as well as the belief that land was a special resource that should be a common resource to all people, as written about in the *Popul Vuh*.

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The advent of the Spanish conquest over the Mayan people changed the relationship to the land. Through the *encomienda* system approved by the Spanish crown, the *encomenderos* forced the indigenous people to labor in the fields they lived on to produce new crops that had no cultural significance or tradition in the country. *Encomienda* systems were intended to favor Mayan people to the Spanish colonists. The Mayas would grow crops for their new landowner’s benefit, and the new crops that they grew, primarily coffee and cacao, became inextricably tied to the imperialist era and the first notions of globalization. The *encomenderos* also claimed ownership of the land, since the Mayas had never legally acquired land for ownership due to their religious beliefs. The approval of the Spanish crown facilitated the takeover of land, allowing new colonists to force the indigenous natives to relocate together into small villages, called *reducciones*.

The indigenous people could no longer access the best farmland to produce food for themselves, instead they had to work as forced labor. When the rulers of Spain later required the Mayans to be paid for their labor on the colonists’ fields, the *encomienda* system was replaced at the beginning of the 17th century with the *repartimiento* draft system, which was highly abused despite the promise of a minimum wage salary and the ability of workers to return to their homes at night. More Mayas were forced into labor and mistreated. Disease and malnutrition became rampant among the indigenous population. The newly enacted systems of labor, coupled with the Mayan people’s lack of a centralized and unifying political system and desire to keep the fertile land ownerless, allowed the Spanish to wield heavy influence and take over the entire systems of government and agriculture. The Spanish colonizers recognized the potential to profit from the underdevelopment of Latin America, especially through export agriculture, and saw no reason to pay for labor. Moral obligation was not a factor, since oppressive racial hierarchies had already been firmly developed between the *encomenderos* and the indigenous people. Yet the colonists’ system of export-based profit quickly made Guatemala dependent on this trade and created structural imbalances that would impede sustainable and long-term development of both industry and the agricultural economy.

Developing this comparative advantage (the export of primary goods) through the use of coerced labor, rather than a wage-earning workforce and machinery, at the expense of capitalizing local industry (thus also creating a need for the import of industrial goods) promoted the fortunes of a few profit-seeking investors in Latin America in the short run — and it was they rather than feudal barons who determined the economic practices of their countries. In the long run, however, this orientation was to drain Latin American countries of their surplus while maintaining their highly specialized dependence on the volatile economic and political policies of the industrial centers of world capitalism. The industrial centers of world capitalism were able to use the market for their own advantage... thus they were able to determine all the prices in the world marketing system.

Farming for subsistence was being replaced by farming for international export. Imposition on the Mayan people and their system of agriculture peaked in the late 19th century. This time period was characterized by a great increase in global demand for coffee. In response to increased demand, the transitioning government wanted to allow coffee cultivation to expand markedly. La Reforma Liberal of the 1870s was a program put in place by President Justo Rufio Barrios, as a means of establishing Guatemala in the global export market. As President and an established member of the elite, Barrios believed in Auguste Comte’s philosophy of Positivism — the ideology that “the elite must take charge of the conduct of society” on the assumption that the individual material gains of successful businessmen would influence and benefit the rest of society. According to David McCrery, a historian and scholar on liberal development, “Barrios committed Guatemala to the world market system and the international division of labor implied by free trade...Guatemala’s role in the world system was that of producer of agricultural raw materials for export, particularly coffee, in which the republic enjoyed an apparent comparative advantage.” Allowing elite interest to shape economic policy created greater dependence on exportation.

The new governmental mandates allowed the elite of the developing coffee industry to bypass the Mayan tradition of leaving land ownerless, giving them the power to purchase and use fertile lands for private, commercial farming purposes. Though the focus was supposed to be on “vacant and public lands, and those owned by religious bodies,” land acquisition for coffee farming progressed further into all existing lands that the Mayan people had farmed for centuries — even before the time of the *encomienda* and *reducciones* systems. In this way, land transferred from the power of the indigenous farmers to the *ladino* administration. Today, Guatemala has the highest existing land inequality in all of Latin America.

Those interested in entering the global market generally characterized the ideologies of the indigenous people as concentrated on maintaining culture and tradition. These views were in distinct opposition to *ladino* ideologies. Demands for labor were increasing as coffee production rose to meet global demand, yet local indigenous farmers did not want to work for the new *ladino* farm owners. “Their lifestyle [was] worlds removed from the modern and capitalistic western world, characterized by a reverence for entrepreneurial ambition and a focus on international markets.”

Land acquisition and use for capitalistic foreign trade was expanded to the extent that even farming and small-scale production were no longer possible. The goals of the government were to be competitive in the foreign market, leaving farmers with little to no influence to increase production independently. The Maya had become a commodity themselves — the labor force behind the capitalistic dreams of the governmental administration, itself working under the structure imposed by the participating developed countries.
Farmer

All of the agricultural shifts that have taken place have led to a decrease in family plots for milpa farming, or production of corn and beans, which are staples of the Guatemalan diet. Basic food crops accounted for 58 percent of used agricultural area before 1979, compared to 37.4 percent in 1979.¹⁵ There was also a downward trend in per capita staple food production of -0.3 percent per year.¹⁶ With domestic food production stagnating as exports took over more and more agricultural land, this small-scale milpa farming is now a monoculture tradition on the most infertile land in the higher altitudes of the western highlands. The most fertile land is used to farm the labor-intensive export crops, largely introduced in Guatemala by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Latin American Agribusiness Corporation S.A. (LAAD).¹⁷ Added to that is that the global market is in control of production and pricing.

The rural farmers of Guatemala, who lack access to market information, cannot foresee fluctuations in the external market. These farmers do not know their consumers, and rather than being able to set prices in the domestic sector are entirely dependent on fluctuating produce prices in foreign markets. As for the United States and other foreign consumers, most remain unaware of the consequences of their consumption trends.

Production of export goods makes Mayan farmers much more vulnerable to crop failure, a devastating outcome due to the labor-intensity of these non-traditional crops, as well as rejection from packing plants that demand a higher cosmetic quality of products. Fischer notes that the Mayas are exploited by the coyotes for economic gain and involvement in the capitalist global market and suffer the most when the market takes a hit, because they are already living in poverty.¹⁸

And when the market takes a hit, it takes a large hit. In 2001 a severe drought in eastern Guatemala wiped out a large percentage of coffee production. Most coffee production in Guatemala is on gigantic mono-crop plantations, where farmers depend solely on the “cash crop” for their income. Due to production losses, nearly 190,000 farmers lost their jobs between 2000 and 2001, according to ANACAFE, Guatemala’s National Coffee Association.¹⁹ In this time frame, coffee prices dropped to all-time lows, from $90.60 per quintal to $6.80.²⁰ Total Guatemalan revenue coming from coffee dropped by nearly half between 2000 and 2001.²¹ Even small experimental farms the size of Santa Anita La Unión, which have successfully cut out many of the export middlemen, suffered greatly. Poor economic conditions coupled with water scarcity and low access to food brought about a disaster. According to USAID, in 2002 over half of the country’s children were estimated to have stunted growth and high levels of malnutrition.²² In addition, the indigenous Mayan population had twice the rates of malnutrition of the non-Indigenous ladino population.²³

According to USAID, in 2002 over half of the country’s children were estimated to have stunted growth and high levels of malnutrition. In addition, the indigenous Mayan population had twice the rates of malnutrition of the non-Indigenous ladino population.

market, Guatemalan farmers must also contend with slow reconstruction efforts after the devastating, 36-year civil war (1960-1996). The war mutilated not only the agricultural terrain, but also the spirit of the war-stricken people of Guatemala. In the aftermath, the filtering nature of the peace accords along with the existing structure of export agriculture have contributed to both little socioeconomic development and continuing inequality for the indigenous producers. Even worse, many of the risk factors faced by these farmers leave them without the necessary access to and money for aid. Aid efforts to date have not been able to change this structure. And more efforts need to be redirected to providing a buffer for farmers against the fluctuations in the international market and environmental conditions.

On September 9, 2009, President Álvaro Colom declared Guatemala in a “state of calamity,” submitting his plea for international assistance. Environmental effects, especially climate change, were stated as a major factor of the drastic increase in the number of malnourished Guatemalans. The summer of 2009 marked a period of extreme drought that caused subsistence and export farmers alike to lose crop yields and thereby lose all food and goods to sell in the market.

However, chronic and widespread malnutrition has deep roots in the country and has been a publicly recognized problem of inequality for decades.

Malnutrition and its Roots in Guatemala

One cause of chronic malnutrition, like the challenge facing Guatemala, was outlined as a cycle between malnutrition and infection by researchers Scrimshaw, Taylor, and Gordon in their 1959 review paper in the American Journal of Medical Sciences. They offered evidence that malnutrition caused greater vulnerability to infection, and infection caused a lower nutritional status.²⁴ This ongoing cycle would eventually lead to kwashiorkor and marasmus, the two highly detectable forms of malnutrition existing in Guatemala. Those affected by kwashiorkor have severe protein deficiency, which causes the body to swell up because it retains liquids.²⁵ Marasmus is a combination of both severe protein and calorie deficiency, in which an affected person’s bones are barely covered by skin.²⁶ If malnutrition at this level of severity is left untreated, it can result in death. On Septem-
ber 11, 2009, it was reported that 25 Guatemalan children had already died in the year from severe malnourishment.

The Institute of Nutrition of Central American and Panama carried out an extensive research project on malnutrition and the influential effects of nutritional supplements in over 2,000 people in impoverished villages of Guate- mala from 1969 to 1977. In the four villages chosen for the study, participants – children under the age of seven and pregnant women – in two of the villages received maize gruel highly supplemented with a protein called Atole, while the participants in the other two villages received Fresco, a sweet fruit-flavored drink lacking any additional protein. The results over 30 years showed a clear correlation between higher cognitive development, lower mortality, and better growth in those children who received the high-protein supplement.

The study reveals much about malnutrition and the correlation to all aspects of life and development, especially in the context of children. Before the mid-20th century, malnutrition was seen as a one-track epidemic problem. Malnutrition in young children between conception and age two was seen as a problem for causing brain damage, which would decrease intellectual development, as this is the time period when the brain grows to roughly 80 percent of its adult size. Despite the very harmful and inhibitory effects of brain damage in young children, these effects were found to be repairable if the child was properly nourished later in childhood. Many other effects of malnutrition, however, have since been uncovered, such as correlations to withdrawal from social interaction, a key factor in healthy child development.

What Are People Eating? An Anthropological Context

In the era of the Mayas, before the Spanish, the two major crops consumed were maize and a cereal known as amaranth. The Spanish influence over agricultural patterns carried over into the food sector as well. Many Spanish foods became quite common throughout Latin America. These dishes included enchiladas, guacamole, tamale and tortillas.

Both traditional and non-traditional exports have caused a decrease in the availability of fruit and vegetables in the domestic Guatemalan market. Fruits and vegetables are necessities to the indigenous people because of their income as well as total availability. Global nutrition policy recommends the intake of fruits and vegetables every single day; yet, the indigenous population continues to eat only what is readily available to them at a low cost — usually only tortillas made of mashed corn and water.

“Today, a majority of people know what they should and should not eat, but their economic situation presents a huge barrier... Fruits and vegetables in the diet have become a luxury,” says a community member of Santa Anita La Unión.

Tortillas and beans are also considered the staples of the Guatemalan diet. They are so essential to the diet that they “may not be considered as food but as medicine, because they are essential to health and life.” In the domestic market, prices of meat turnovers, known as empanadas, and hot beef sandwichs are lower than fruits and vegetables as well. These foods are thought of as not only nutritionally but emotionally and symbolically significant to general well-being.

Sticky Solutions and the Future

Most of the headline news articles describing malnutrition in Guatemala have pitched starving children and their families, evoking pity and guilt in readers and asking for donations from those who care. World-renowned organizations take donated funds and use them to provide food for those in need. However, all of these aid efforts have yet to show sustainable improvements. A community member, passionate about the issue of sustainability, points out, “Emergency aid does not solve malnutrition. They will be able to hand out food baskets for one or two weeks.”

When President Colom requested international aid, the world responded. On November 19, 2009, USAID announced its plan to provide $15 million in emergency assistance, targeting the regions identified by the Guatemalan government requiring urgent attention: Chiquimula, El Progreso, Jalapa, Jutiapa, and Zacapa. The assistance included “approximately 7,600 metric tons of food... distributed to a total of 41,050 families in 365 communities.” USAID has provided Guatemala with food security assistance for over three decades, with an ongoing allocated budget of about $50 million per year for food security assistance. Unfortunately, the combination of rising food prices throughout the world and the economic crisis have left the World Food Programme, another necessary support in Guatemala’s food needs, scrambling for enough funds to continue their VitaCareTM program. At the end of 2009, they were short $5 million, which the media said could potentially “affect the nutrition of 100,000 children and 30,000 pregnant and lactating women.”

Domestic policy in this arena has always been hard to affect. Says a representative from FUNDAP:

- The problem is not only quantity of food remaining in the country. There is often a lot of food that is produced, but there is no structure in which it can be properly distributed for people to have the access they need.

A contributing factor may be that Barrios’ prescription to the theory of Positivism, or the elite acting in the interest of all, is still in effect in Guatemala today. The negative consequences of these power structures and attitudes have given way to a system in which money in the country may not go towards a cause like treating malnutrition in Guatemala’s poorest districts simply because these effects do not reach the upper class. Loewenburg writes:

- While the very rich reap the benefits of Guatemala’s agricultural bounty (the top 20 percent of the population take two-thirds of the country’s income), they give little back. Tax revenues in Guatemala are among the very lowest in Latin America, smaller even than its poorest neighbors.

Yet despite the structural problems inherent in the past and present of Guatemala, the international community must realize that these are situations that are almost impossible to reconcile. Fischer suggests that there needs to be a “dual consciousness in how we think of changing the world.” This dual consciousness recognizes that the system has flaws, but that one cannot focus solely on these flaws and blame them for existing problems. Instead, one must be conscious of success cases and build off of them to affect real change. At the moment, Guatemala cannot depend heavily on international assistance, and needs to become domestically sustainable with its food production in order to fully alleviate the food crisis and reduce widespread chronic malnutrition.

It is in the international community’s best interest to invest in policies that would aid in preventing developing cases of malnutrition altogether. The effects that malnutrition...
can have on intellectual progress can prevent a child who is given the opportunity to go to school from learning or reaching their full potential.

- The U.S. invests billions of dollars in education [in Guatemala], yet much of this money goes to waste when children appear at the school door intellectually crippled from under-nutrition. The immediate expense of nutrition programs and broader interventions should be considered a critical investment in the future. Malnutrition alters the educational preparedness and, later, workforce productivity, making it an unacceptable risk for its victims as well as for a nation’s strength and competitiveness.⁷⁰

5. Strengthen the institutional capacities of the National Food and Nutrition Security – SINASAN – and Civil Society to reduce food insecurity and nutrition.³⁸

This initiative has only been reported on as of February 2010, and it will take time to see the real versus expected impact of the program. The EU states that it trusts the Guatemalan government and its partnership with all other organizations coming to aid the program and funding. The Importance of Acting Locally and Hope for the Future

To access the nearest market to Santa Anita La Unión, it is necessary to hitch a ride on the back of a pickup truck and ride about 45 minutes into Colombia. People from all over the Quetzaltenango province must come here to buy their food. In Santa Anita, one community member is designated to buy for a large group because of the inconvenience of getting to market. The market in Colombia is comprehensive and very busy. People haggle over prices and settle on deals, and a multitude of foods are bought and sold. Many consumers gravitate towards the grain products – tortillas, pan dulce – and meat products, especially chicken.

As a community member who works on nutritional well-being in the geographic area states:

- The majority of people know what they should and should not eat, but their economic situation prevents them from making the right decisions. For example, often times fruits and vegetables are seen as luxuries over the staple foods (corn and beans), but this should not be the case. In meetings, we tell the parents to start encouraging the children to buy a fruit instead of chips – but when the children are used to these cheap snacks from childhood, they do not have the appetite for foods that may be healthier for them.³⁹

Acting locally and working with people’s cultural knowledge may be the key to producing sustainable results to a well-endowed program for action. How do we teach children about the necessity and importance of eating well? Solutions may have to come from the older generation teaching the younger generation. Exporting, for all the pain it has caused the Guatemalan people, has provided a bigger economic base. If each exporting farm were to allocate a portion of its land to growing food for sustenance in the community, it would allow a much easier way to access food when needed. A community member voiced his reservations with this as he said:

- We don’t have many resources to allocate to have community members plant things other than coffee or the funds to raise for more nutritional produce here at this time... however, a small project implemented and funded could provide us a better quality of life. It’s ironic, as in the fair trade market, only the highest quality crops are accepted. They take care of the health of the land as well as the health of the consumer. We don’t consume the high quality food here in Guatemala because we must purchase whatever is cheapest. It is important to focus on bringing in different services that can benefit the people.⁴⁰

Sensitivity to cultural nuances must also be navigated in the ways in which nutritional aid is implemented as well. A community member in Santa Anita works with promoting Chispitas, a tasteless powder that can be added to any meal to provide essentials such as vitamin A, iron, zinc, vitamin C, and folate acid to food that is served in homes, especially to children. Though this sounds like an optimal solution, he cites problems with this approach in the implementation phase:

- Of 1,000 children of families that we have targeted in the area, we believe only 30 percent are using the Chispitas powder. Families come back to us and say that their kids said that the ‘taste’ was a problem for their children. However, since we know the powder is tasteless and unrecognizable in food, we believe that the simple addition of a strange powder to dinner may come off as unappetizing to a child who is watching, who will then refuse to eat. Personal involvement in bettering nutritional status needs to be seen as a widespread social initiative for things to change.⁴¹

- Sustainability promises the capacity to endure if the Guatemalan government and the world at large can promise this to the poorest Guatemalans. Those struggling to make ends meet can truly be helped. The history of Guatemala’s incorporation into the exportation market offers us a lens to view the multitude of problems that we face today to combat chronic malnutrition. However, history is the past: It is now the time to set in motion the right program for action. How do we teach children about the necessity and importance of eating well? Solutions may have to come from the older generation teaching the younger generation.
1. The local market of Colomba boasts a variety of different fruits that are in season. The demand for these is not nearly as high as for staple foods: tortillas and beans. The price of these fruits is significantly higher than that of staples.
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BETWEEN WESTERN AND I-94, CERMAK AND 16TH
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Every morning my mother woke up, got in her mini-van, and drove a few blocks down Ashby until it turned to Western at the Chicago border. She drove further and further, passing restaurants with signs promising food in multiple languages. There were the bright, fresh signs for upscale restaurants, and ones with blocky letters that usually meant cheap and delicious. She passed used car lots and parks with signs screaming "SAFE ZONE: Higher Penalties for Criminal Activities Here". She drove down the wide streets where the sun glinting off the warm brick buildings always gave a feeling of late afternoon sleepiness, no matter the time. She turned east towards the lake on Cermak and parked in front of the church that was her workplace. She worked with the women who lived in the neighborhood, helping them navigate a strange new place. A place with different weather, different language, different values. A place where all this different-ness was compounded by the fact that their existence in the United States was not known to the US government.

She taught them writing. Not English, but writing in Spanish, their native language. And mostly it was a place where they could drop off their kids, talk to their friends and get support and advice. They could compare how to dress their kids for the winter, and they could tell their stories of missing their homes, and the people that make it home. Their sisters and brothers, mothers and fathers, childhood friends. People they would not get to see for years because of the danger of going back and forth.

When lonely, it’s mostly the magnification of little things and an abundance of time that cause pain. A lack of a call, a snub by someone who should have said hello, these things bounce through your head, reflecting off the inner surfaces of the skull and growing in power, the dreaded memory expanding like a swelling bruise until it fills the brain, covering everything in a layer of sickliness until all other memories and events are seen through this dark lens. When those that are closest to you are not around, and there is no one to ensure that yes, you are loved, people do care about you and want to be with you, the rest of the world’s tiny actions explode into the main narrative of your life, the shallow joys of these micro-relationships no match for the deep ocean of desolation that you are treading in right now, waiting for the people you have yet to meet to come and rescue you or the ones you have known to step back in and pull you out.

The first Mexicans to immigrate to Chicago found work the only way they could: as strikebreakers. Scabs, the people who are too cowardly to make the sacrifices like the other strikers. Everyone was going without so that everyone’s life would improve, but some people just couldn’t be patient. They had to walk past the workers, get rocks thrown at them, get called awful names. They had to witness the pain they were causing others, people who just wanted better lives for themselves and their families. They had to live somehow. They were living at the cost of others, who were trying to help not only themselves, but the scabs as well.

In the end, it didn’t matter. The strikes were broken and the Mexican workers were fired. Nothing changed for anyone else. For Mexicans, however, the discrimination simply grew. They weren’t even allowed into the Catholic churches of the Eastern European groups. Denied even to worship their religion until they got dioceses of their own. The clumsiness of speech spreads throughout the body, making every limb feel huge. Every movement is magnified and spotlit, as if the lack of words puts more pressure on everything else to communicate. Everyone else is sped up, you are slowed down. There are no ways for people to understand the real you. Your accent puts everything you say in a different light, and you are a different person in one language than in another. In one, you are considered smart, funny, someone people listen to. In another, your clumsy efforts are indulged until the listener’s patience runs out. Is it even worth it? Soon you decide it isn’t, and only speak when absolutely necessary.

I went to my mother’s workplace once when I was thirteen. We made a day out of it, exploring the neighborhood around her. Pilsen was named after the Czech town of Plzeň because of the Czech immigrants who settled there. By the 70’s, Mexican-American immigrants were the majority. Now the neighborhood is home to colorful murals on the walls of brick buildings and signs in Spanish, some
translated to English and some not. Men sit behind stands on the side of the road selling *elote*, corn on the cob that sits in its boiled water all day until it’s mushy, then slathered in mayonnaise and lime juice and chili powder. The huge candy emporium sells Bubbaloo, gum with juice inside, lollipops in the colors of the Mexican flag, mango chili lollipops, which are spicy and sweet. We went to El Milagro for sope, little corn cakes with beans, cheese, lettuce, salsa and chicken. We went to Bon Bon, a bakery that specializes in *tres leches*, my favorite milky cake.

After lunch, we went to Our Lady of Tepeyac. We walked into a room meant for Sunday School, toys put away in low shelves, drawn pictures of Bible stories covering the walls. We sat in tiny chairs at small tables. I met one of my mom’s students. She talked about how she made the terrible journey to get to the US. My Spanish was not great, but I could understand the main points. She had to say goodbye to her friends, family, and homeland, all she’d ever known. She came with her husband and older child. She had to leave her baby behind. They paid a man, a coyote, to hide in his van. They were taken across the border. They lived in Texas for a while. She had to repeat the whole process in order to get her other child across. Finally she made her way to Chicago. Her husband works all day, literally from sunrise until sunset, or later. She stays with the kids. She said the worst part was the loneliness. Until she began the writing class, she knew no one. It was she and two small children, afraid to leave their small apartment. Isolated through language, through fear.

The gaps are the worst. Wrist, eyes, neck, the places where the fabric of two pieces of clothing don’t quite meet and it comes and finds you. Scratching its teeth against your exposed skin, wind rubbing it raw. Finding its way inside your flesh, causing shivers all through your body. Large ones, not delicate little ah ah ah shivers, but deep and long lasting, more convulsions. It takes you by surprise every time you step outside. Spring feels like the reward for a hard-fought battle, a personal treasure that you alone deserve. The joy of putting your head down, pushing through the darkness, and finding your way to the other side. “As you float now, where I held you and let go, remember when fear cramped your heart what I told you: lie gently and wide to the light – year stars, lie back, and the sea will hold you.” – First Lesson, Robert Booth
Nicholas Dynan is a multimedia journalist who joins this new medium with a background in photography. He is driven by a passion for human rights and social justice; not only a witness, he works with both a voice and an opinion. While aware of the technical craft, he seeks to engage issues critically, attune to the ethical implications and consequences of his work. Storytelling is essential and he aims to engage audience members through compelling video, images, sound, and text.

A senior at Tufts University, where he majors in sociology and minors in media and communications, he is a co-leader of EXPOSURE, the Institute for Global Leadership’s student-led photojournalism and human rights initiative. He has been awarded grants for EXPOSURE workshops in Cambodia and Houston, and for photojournalism projects in Turkey. He has contributed to domestic and international news outlets including Global Post, Hürriyet Daily News, and NPR affiliates.

Currently, Nicholas Dynan is embarking on two projects. One project explores an eco-commune in Northern Virginia, examining the intersection of the farm-to-table movement with millennials seeking a place in American society. The other examines social inequality, gentrification, and community activism in a Puerto Rican enclave in the heart of Boston.
A Search For Home

“As you float now, where I held you and let go, remember when fear cramps your heart what I told you: lie gently and wide to the light—year stars, lie back, and the sea will hold you.” – First Lesson, Robert Booth

I came to Houston following six months photographing in Turkey. Covering a relentless news cycle, I found my heart racing at the possibility of danger; when police attacked protesters, and rioters lit fires. I imagined the recognition I would receive making an image in the heat of one of these moments. The next step for me would be combat photography; it would be another shot of adrenaline and another path to achievement.

Arriving in Houston for the EXPOSURE/Aftermath photojournalism workshop exploring issues of race in Houston’s Third Ward, I threw myself into a project focusing on the lack of job opportunities in the Third Ward. Specifically, I followed residents who lived in the community, but worked beyond its borders. As the photographer, if my choice in focusing on a story about employment tells anything about me, it was of my desire—just like that of my subjects—to achieve. Yet, as my images emerged throughout the week, it became clear that they were not only about achievement, but also about how detached I felt.

I found myself making images in cars on endless asphalt highways, coming and going between the worlds of employment and home. It was the experience of transience; I was unsure of where my foundation lay.

Halfway through the workshop, I put my camera down. I spent hours in front of paintings at museums in Houston. I searched for what photography really meant to me. I was searching myself for my core—or for what others might call home.

Strangely enough, one place home became clearest was in the home of another—that of the Barnes family. I was graciously welcomed into the Barnes household and over the next three days, I created images of their family; their interactions, and the space they lived in.

The motivation for this work stems from a desire to create a dialogue regarding the perceived expectations of Black families living in the Third Ward. The images that I made during this time are not the same as I hoped to make in Turkey, they ask questions, provide little answers, and challenge viewers. At the same time, my desire to experience their emotions, maybe a longing for childhood and family, also drives this work. There, under their roof and in their presence, I was not motivated by recognition, danger or violence, but rather this family’s tremendous love for each other.

I can only offer these images and my sincere thanks to, The Barnes, Matt, Anne, Benjamin, Olivia, and Ellie and, my instructors, Sara Terry and Jeff Jacobson.
In the Third Ward, a historically black neighborhood in Houston, Ellie Barnes, the youngest of three, eats a dinner of homemade pizzas.
2. Benjamin, Olivia, and Ellie Barnes, siblings, eat pasta with pesto sauce for dinner. The Third Ward community is well known for its past prosperity, particularly along Dowling Street, a center for black business and culture.
3. Ellie and Olivia Barnes wash dishes with their father Matt. While prosperous during the 60’s, the Third Ward has since experienced decades of economic decline.
4. Olivia Barnes plays with a butterfly net. While some of the Third Ward remains crippled by a lack of resources, there has been an increased interest by affluent black families in the neighborhood.
5. Ellie and Olivia dress as a princess and a tiger in their room. The children attend a private school that supports a mixture of traditional and home schooling.
6. Matt smells Olivia’s arms to check whether she has cleaned them after a bath. Matt is currently a grant officer at the Houston Endowment.
After reading with their children, the Barnes family prays together. The family plays an active part in a local church.
8. Anne and Matt share a hug in their kitchen after a long day at work and taking care of their children.
9. After dinner, Anne leads Ellie to her room to get ready for bed.
10. As they do every night, Anne, Ellie, and Olivia pray together before bed.
11. Anne and Matt prepare their children for bed.
12. Anne kisses Ellie after tucking her into bed.
AN ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION-BASED IMMIGRATION TO ZHENGZHOU,
Xuhui Wang is a student at Peking University majoring in Ecology with a minor in International Studies. He is one of the international students who attended the EPIIC international symposium. Inspired by the conversations at symposium, he designed and initiated this research project on the Household Registration System (HRS) in China. He has also lead a local volunteer organization at Peking University. Outside of school, he is active in research and efforts concerning environment, cities and humanitarian issues in China.

Jun Zhou is a senior majoring in Urban Planning with a minor in Economics with a concentration on Urbanization at Peking University. As the core member of the HRS research project sponsored by the Institute for Global Leadership, she became involved in two series of fieldwork in China, analyzing a great deal of both first and second-hand data. She is currently engaged in researching urban sprawl and the impact of urban growth on the quality of life in China.

Xueyi Yang is a senior majoring in Urban-Rural Planning and Resources Management with a Double Major in economics at Peking University. Her research interests are urbanization and land policy. She presented the HRS proposal at the 2009 EPIIC symposium. With financial support from the IGL, she conducted two field studies in Zhengzhou and finished the final report in cooperation with her classmate, Jun Zhou. Her recent studies focus on the smart growth and land use pattern in developing countries.
Our research into the Household Registration System, or *hukou* system, in China, began in September 2009 and is an ongoing endeavor. The Household Registration System (HRS) was implemented in China in 1958, essentially preventing Chinese citizens from changing their city of residence without government permission or sanction. If citizens moved their residence without permission, they would be ineligible for a broad variety of benefits from housing to schooling in the city where they relocated.

Students from Peking University conducted two field studies in Zhengzhou, where a population explosion occurred in 2003 after the limitations on rural-urban migration were lifted under HRS reform. By picking Zhengzhou as a case study, the authors sought to gain a well rounded and in-depth understanding of this unique system used to regulate rural-urban migration in China.

A. General Description of Data Collected

As the chart (Figure 1) shows, immigration reached its peak in 2003, reflective of the loosened limitations on HRS in the same year.

According to government regulations, *Hukou* transfers are only allowed when an individual’s immediate relative is a local resident. However, the data (Figure 2) clearly show that immigration by non-direct relatives, such as cousins, also exists. This phenomenon was most prevalent in 2003, when HRS was being reformed.
B. Relation Between HRS and Education

From our last visit to Zhengzhou, we are aware that the main motive behind immigration is education for children. Parents may do everything they can to transfer to big cities to obtain the chance of a better education for their children. Here, as quantitative evidence in the chart (Figure 3) shows, the proportion of migrants of school age (right) is much higher than those of the average age (left).

As expected, the proportion of immigrants in the group of school-age children is much higher, indicating that the motive behind irregular immigration is higher than average especially when driven by a desire for education.

Since the data collected is limited to that from Hukou registration, we do not have access to information such as family income or parents’ professions, strong factors that also often influence migrant behavior. However, another influential factor, the distance migrated, can be obtained by looking at the registered places of departure.

First, we collected information on the departure location of school-age immigrants and calculated the distance between these areas and Zhengzhou by Web GIS, as mapped here (Figure 4).

Then, we analyzed the relation between the immigration intensity of school-age children and the distance traveled to immigrate to Zhengzhou (Figure 5).

As expected, intensity decreases as the distance traveled increases. Two factors exert influence on this. The first is the cost of transfer. The second is the accessibility of transfer information. The former would increase and the latter would decrease as distance increases.

Although we could not specifically analyze other factors due to the accessibility of data, we could, after all, draw the conclusion that distance is one influential obstacle in education-related Hukou migration. Therefore, when discussing education-related emigrating behaviors, both attracting factors and hindering factors should be taken into consideration.

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<th>Place of Departure</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Immigration Intensity</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuyang</td>
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George Kolev is a senior at Tufts University majoring in History. He was born in Sofia, Bulgaria and learned Russian on a trip to his mother's small hometown in the Western Urals when he was six. Back home, he was given some Pushkin and Lermontov to read and has been, since then, writing rhymes.
Ein Mann told me once in earnest that in this wide world of ours it’s hard – ain’t it though? – with someone to talk ‘bout this and that really.

“Well, mate, if the case be such, then (I told said lad), go on a-talkin’: we both, and a cup of tea—brewed, by the way, in a Chinese kettle worth four hundred and five rubles—you go on, and I, j’écoute, Being together, to quote Monsieur Pushkin, is cute.”

“Well, aight – spake the lad – why don’t we? Here, take, for instance, Putin: for what goddamned pretty reason d’we find him so deeply soothing and our taste buds moan with sweetness for this pseudo-political pudding, for this neo-revanchist blin?”

He asked and I found my seat, and (moving an inch and a half closer) I wanted to tell him in earnest that we—

—we can’t perhaps understand such matters, and that all that stuff – the caviar, and wars, and poesie, will repeat itself, and that mate there’s no sense looking for some sense in this whole mess, and that the only comfy way is to not give a damn, and move to Dublin—

— but I didn’t. For right then I heard in kitchen tones half-serious and half-absurd my Chinese kettle a-bubblin’.

Ein Mann мне сказал однажды, что в мире большом-голубом трудно—не правда ли?—с кем-то помолвить о том о сём.

“Ну, парень, коль жизнь такая, (сказал я) давай, парл-ёвай, мы оба, за чашкой чая—чайник, кстати, из Китая, четыре́сот пяти́рублевый—ты давай, а я j’écoute: вдвоём, как сказал Пушкин, круто.”

“Ну, если уж—парень молвит—давай. Вот, к примеру, Путин. С какого такового чёрта d’we find him so deeply soothing? и кажется сладким этот псе́до-политическй пудинг, нео-реванши́стский блин?”

Спросил он, и я присел, и, придивнувшись на аршин, ответить как раз хотел, что нам-то таких вот дел нельзя, может быть, понять, что всё там будет опять—и стихи, и икра, и рать—что мысли нет, брат, исказать some sense in this sлякую блять, и лучше бы наплевать,

но в кухне тогда вскипел китайский чайник и не успел.
PRAYER

Jimmy Pianka

Jimmy Pianka is a writer and musician who graduated from Tufts University in 2010 with a BA in Cognitive and Brain Science and Philosophy. He currently fights the good fight as the lead singer and lyricist of the rock band Arrow to the Sun. He wrote this poem during his semester abroad sitting right behind the Dalai Lama’s temple in Dharamsala, India.

Life piles on life, teems inside of life, compounding itself again and again until whole worlds brim with mind.

This sphere is a nursery with words to name itself, jeweled intellect laughing and tracing shapes on the walls of caves, each finger outlined in blue paint to show just how pretty our hands are.

Voices pour from the Earth like heat, all history projected in gold radio streams to chatter in empty dust clouds & void, the full range of our hearts on display.

May our presence be a bell in silence of space.